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"CLIENTLESS" PROSECUTORS
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs' lawyers in damages class actions and criminal
prosecutors have much more in common than people realize.'
They are both "clientless" lawyers2 -lawyers whose clients are
diffuse entities without a decisionmaking structure. Accordingly,
these "clientless" lawyers have to make decisions that would be
reserved to clients in other types of representation such as
decisions about the objectives of representation or whether to
resolve a dispute without litigation.
Because of the nature of prosecutors' and class counsel's clients,
there is no reason to expect these clients to hold their lawyers
accountable in the way that we expect of lawyers and clients in
most scenarios. Clients with a substantial interest in their
litigation have a reason to keep an eye on their lawyers. But the
primary reason for the class action device and its accompanying
procedures-especially in small-claim cases-is that class
members do not have a sufficient incentive to monitor their
lawyers; the small amount at stake is not worth the time cost. For
prosecutors, similarly, most members of the public don't care about
the vast majority of cases that churn through the criminal justice
system.3 The ultimate stick that most clients wield is the ability to
I Russell M. Gold, "Clientless" Lawyers, 92 WASH. L. REV. 87 (2017) [hereinafter Gold,
"Clientless" Lawyers]. I focus on damages class actions because there is reason to think that
lawyers' motivations in traditional civil rights class actions are quite different than in
small-claim monetary cases, such as the typical consumer class action. I do not mean to
suggest that the distinction is binary with all lawyers in damages cases thinking about
their own bottom lines and all lawyers in injunctive relief cases thinking themselves
something else entirely.
2 I call them "clientless" because, as a practical matter, these lawyers can largely
operate as though they are clientless. Nonetheless, I use the quotation marks because I
contend that it is important for even these "chentless" lawyers to remain faithful to their
diffuse clients.
To be clear, I do not mean that these lawyers are clientless in the same sense as
lawyers who lack actual clients but serve in important committee roles in multidistrict
litigation as other scholars have used this term. See Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller,
The Quasi-Class Action Method of Managing Multi-District Litigations: Problems and a
Proposal, 63 VAND. L. REV. 107, 151 (2010) (employing "clientless" in that context).
3 Criminal defendants of course have a particularized stake in their own cases sufficient
to warrant monitoring their lawyer, but this Article is focused on the government side of the
"v." On that side, some cases have identifiable victims who have a strong interest in
monitoring the prosecutor, but the individual victims themselves are not the prosecutor's
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fire their lawyers if they're unhappy. But neither absent class
members, named plaintiffs, nor members of the prosecutor's
public-client can fire the aggregate-client's lawyer, save for
occasional contested district attorney elections.4
Although both systems try to deal with problems of lawyer
accountability, they take very different approaches. One striking
difference is the extent of judicial review. Class actions rely on
judges-potentially informed by the input of defendants or
objectors-to ensure that class counsel faithfully represents her
client.5  Criminal law, by contrast, nearly swears off judicial
review entirely over critical decisions like charging,6 including
when the prosecutors' charging decisions tie judges' hands at
sentencing as may be the case with mandatory minimums or
sentencing enhancements.7 Certifying a class action in federal
client. CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-1.3 (4th ed.
2015) ("The prosecutor generally serves the public and not any particular government
agency, law enforcement officer or unit, witness or victim."); Bruce A. Green & Fred C.
Zacharias, Prosecutorial Neutrality, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 837, 861-62 ("The prosecutor has a
client in an abstract sense-she represents the 'public' or the 'state' .... ). And indeed, the
public as a whole may have very different interests in enforcement than the particularly
aggrieved victims.
4 See Stacy Caplow, What if There is No Client?: Prosecutors as "Counselors" of Crime
Victims, 5 CLINICAL L. REV. 1, 5 (1998) (noting that prosecutors do not have "serious
concerns" for "client autonomy" or "personal accountability"); Developments in the Law:
Conflicts of Interest in the Legal Profession, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1244, 1453 (1981) (describing
how named plaintiffs and absent class members have no ability to control class counsel).
5 See Developments in the Law, supra note 4, at 1453.
6 See Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons
from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 871 (2009) ("In the 95% of cases that are
not tried before a federal judge or jury, there are currently no effective legal checks in place
to police the manner in which prosecutors exercise their discretion to bring charges, to
negotiate pleas, or to set their office policies."); Green & Zacharias, supra note 3, at 847
("[Individual prosecutors' preferences still control a vast range and number of choices, free
of outside or supervisory controls.").
7 See Michael A. Simons, Prosecutors as Punishment Theorists: Seeking Sentencing
Justice, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 303, 330 (2009) ("[S]entencing enhancements create a
largely charge-based system in which prosecutorial decisions determine the sentence."); see
also, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Trial Judge's Role in Plea Bargaining, Part 1, 76 COLUM.
L. REV. 1059, 1063 (1976) (describing that in some of the systems the author observed, "the
task of sentencing in guilty-plea cases had been transferred from the courts to the District
Attorney's office"); Daniel S. McConkie, Judges as Framers of Plea Bargaining, 26 STAN. L.
& POL'Y REV. 61, 63 (2015) ("By selecting the charges, prosecutors strongly influence the
sentence. This is so even where mandatory minimum sentences are not implicated because
the advisory Federal Sentencing Guidelines are influential in plea bargaining and
sentencing."); Jed S. Rakoff, Why Innocent People Plead Guilty, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Nov. 20,
696
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court requires a judge to determine that a class meets all of the
fundamental prerequisites: numerosity, commonality, typicality,
adequacy, predominance, and superiority."
Judges play wildly different roles in reviewing lawyers'
decisions to settle a case in the two systems.9 Once the lawyers
have reached an agreement and before a settlement that binds the
class can be approved in federal court, the court must not only
satisfy itself that the Rule 23 prerequisites listed in the previous
paragraph-such as commonality and predominance-have been
satisfied but must also find after a hearing that the settlement is
substantively fair, reasonable, and adequate to the absent class
2014 ("In actuality, our criminal justice system is almost exclusively a system of plea
bargaining, negotiated behind closed doors and with no judicial oversight. The outcome is
very largely determined by the prosecutor alone."). Courts may invalidate charging
decisions only when they purposely target members of a protected class. See United States
v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 463-68 (1996) (holding that courts should check prosecutors'
charging discretion only when it violates equal protection by purposely discriminating
against a suspect class); see also Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus
Prosecutorial Accountability, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 959, 970 (2009) [hereinafter Bibas,
Prosecutorial Regulation] ("Courts nominally forbid selective prosecution based on race. No
race-based claim has succeeded for more than a century, however."). Of course, judges
continue to review constitutional questions such as search and seizure or Brady violations,
but these types of questions may be irrelevant as a practical matter in our system where
nearly all cases are resolved by guilty plea and many are resolved before suppression
motions-let alone Brady motions-could ever be filed. See Russell M. Gold, Beyond the
Judicial Fourth Amendment: The Prosecutor's Role, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1591, 1629-31
(2014) [hereinafter Gold, Beyond the Judicial Fourth Amendment].
8 FED. R. CIv. P. 23(a), (b)(3). This Article focuses on class counsel in damages cases,
which is why it mentions the predominance and superiority requirements here.
For purposes of the comparison, this discussion of class actions focuses on federal
courts and Rule 23. Although some class actions can and do proceed in state courts, federal
courts have jurisdiction so long as at least one member of the class is a citizen of a different
state than one defendant and the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(d)(2) (2012), or the more traditional bases of federal jurisdiction are met, id. §§ 1331,
1332(a). And defendants typically prefer to remove to federal court when possible. See, e.g.,
Howard B. Stravitz, Recocking the Removal Trigger, 53 S.C. L. REV. 185, 185-86 (2002).
9 David Sklansky and Stephen Yeazell draw out this comparison in a wonderful article,
though they compare the traditional civil case to the criminal plea bargaining process and
note that class actions are different insofar as they require judicial approval on substantive
grounds. David A. Sklansky & Stephen C. Yeazell, Comparative Law Without Leaving
Home: What Civil Procedure Can Teach Criminal Procedure, and Vice Versa, 94 GEO. L.J.
683, 696-705 (2006); see also Russell M. Gold, Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. Andrew Hessick,
Civilizing Criminal Settlements, 97 B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (arguing that the civil
and criminal systems should not take vastly different approaches to facilitating consensual
resolution and that criminal systems should adopt civil procedures). This Article focuses on
the class action context as a basis for comparison.
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members.10 In criminal law, judges' substantive review of guilty
pleas is extremely lenient and deferential. It focuses only on
ensuring that there is a factual basis to support the plea." That
standard does not inquire whether the charges serve the public's
interests. 12
Before the parties have reached an agreement in the civil
system, including in class actions,13 managerial judges actively
seek to manage their caseloads to urge settlement.14 In the federal
criminal system, by contrast, judges are explicitly barred from
involvement in plea negotiations.15  Many states follow the
prohibition in the federal rules, but other states don't.16
Of course there are differences between the class action system
and the criminal justice system. But they share a similar problem
of lawyer accountability, and they are similar in the ways that
matter for purposes of how to address the accountability problem.
Both systems can learn from the other, and each should adopt
aspects of the other system's approach to supplement its own
existing accountability mechanisms.17 This Article considers what
10 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2).
11 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(3); see also 5 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
§ 21.4(f), at 1005-07 (4th ed. 2015) (explaining that many states have adopted a provision
comparable to the federal rule).
12 See Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV. 853, 906 (2007)
("Federal courts are more involved in reviewing plea bargains than charging decisions, but
judges still remain highly deferential."); Rakoff, supra note 7 ("[I]n practice, most judges,
happy for their own reasons to avoid a time-consuming trial, will barely question the
defendant beyond the bare bones of his assertion of guilt. . . .").
13 What is different in class actions than other civil litigation is that the decision to settle on
the plaintiffs side belongs to the lawyer rather than the client. Compare Lazy Oil Co. v. Witco
Corp., 166 F.3d 581, 584, 588-91 (3d Cir. 1999) (approving settlement over the objection of the
named plaintiffs-who are the closest thing to a mouthpiece for the client's interests other
than class counsel), with MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.2(a) (AM. BAR AsS'N 2016)
(providing that clients control the decision of whether to settle and on what terms).
14 See generally Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982).
15 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1).
16 See generally Rishi Raj Batra, Judicial Participation in Plea Bargaining: A Dispute
Resolution Perspective, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 565 (2015) (providing a fifty-state survey of rules
for judicial participation in plea bargaining); Nancy J. King & Ronald F. Wright, The
Invisible Revolution in Plea Bargaining: Managerial Judging and Judicial Participation in
Negotiations, 95 TEX. L. REV. 325 (2016) (empirically studying judicial involvement in plea
negotiations through interviews with judges and attorneys).
17 None of the mechanisms are perfect, and the overlapping use of multiple mechanisms
is valuable. Cf. Zachary D. Clopton, Redundant Public-Private Enforcement, 69 VAND. L.
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criminal law can learn from class actions to improve prosecutor
accountability. 18
The comparison to class actions suggests that criminal law
could improve prosecutor accountability by asking judges to play a
more meaningful role in protecting the prosecutor's public-client as
judges do for class counsel's class-client. As with class action
settlements, judges presented with plea agreements should
substantively assess the terms of those agreements to ensure that
the prosecutor's public-client's interests are well served and that
prosecutors are adhering to their responsibility to afford
defendants fair process. In some respects, the first suggestion is
merely that judges should impose the sentence they think is right
and not be unduly influenced by the lawyers' sentencing
recommendations. But this Article goes further by drawing on the
class action context to suggest two methods to help courts with
that challenging fairness analysis.
First, as in class actions, courts should consider the process that
led to that negotiated sentence.19 In class action law, courts look
more cautiously at class settlements that were not negotiated at
arm's length, were reached very quickly, or were reached without
discovery.20 In the criminal context, if the bargaining process
involved evidence of collusion, exploding offers,21 threats to charge
a mandatory minimum or sentencing enhancement, or lack of
investigation or shared information between the parties, the court
should look particularly carefully at whether the ultimate deal
serves the public-client's interests and evinces a prosecutor
satisfying her constitutional obligations.22 This approach will help
REV. 285, 285-91 (2016) (arguing that redundancy in legal regimes should not always be
treated as a four-letter word).
1s I take up the comparison in the other direction elsewhere. See generally Gold, Clientless
Lawyers, supra note 1.
19 See infra Section IV.A.1.
20 7B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1797.1 (3d ed.
2005).
21 See Stephanos Bibas, Designing Plea Bargaining from the Ground Up: Accuracy and
Fairness Without Trials as Backstops, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1055, 1061 (2016) [hereinafter
Bibas, Designing Plea Bargaining] (describing "strong pressures to plead quickly").
22 But see Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE
L.J. 1909, 1959 (1992) (contending that judges examining the plea bargaining process would
not provide useful information to determine whether counsel secured a good deal).
6992017]
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facilitate meaningful review ex post but can also usefully shape
plea bargaining ex ante by encouraging more information sharing
and discouraging heavy-handed tactics.
Second, as with class members in class actions, judges in
criminal cases should afford members of the prosecutor's public-
client the opportunity to be heard regarding appropriate sentences
in particular cases once the parties have struck a plea deal.23
Victims already have such rights in the federal system and most
state systems,24 but the suggestion is to broaden those rights to
more members of the prosecutor's public-client, potentially
including amici appointed to argue against a plea agreement.
Unlike in class actions, every member of the aggregate client need
not be provided the right to be heard. Most members of the public
will not care to be heard in most criminal cases, but voice rights
provide at least some opportunity for judges to hear dissenting
views when-as in class actions-both parties before the court are
trying to get a deal approved and thus have no incentive to provide
information or reasoning that would undermine that objective.
Lastly, fairness considerations should include comparing the
proposed sentence to the norms for similar cases in the
jurisdiction,25 as two scholars have already suggested.26
Asking judges to carefully evaluate sentence recommendations
and determine what sentence they think is fair has inherent
limitations in systems where prosecutors wield huge sentencing
power because they can charge a mandatory minimum or
sentencing enhancement that ties the judge's hands. When a court
has concern about the fairness of the deal but cannot override the
charging decision, this Article contends that the judge should play
23 See infra Section IV.A.2.
24 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(4) (2012); 5 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 11, § 21.3(f, at 921-22
(explaining that all fifty states have a statutory crime victims' bill of rights, some states
also have constitutional provisions on point, and that victims' rights typically include
allowing the victim to be heard about a plea bargain before the court).
25 See infra Section IV.A. 3.
26 See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 22, at 1959-60 (arguing that "downward discretion" of
sentences by judges "should be encouraged whenever the sentence is substantially above
the 'market level' in the relevant jurisdiction" (emphasis omitted)). That lawyers tend to
warn judges in advance if they plan to recommend a sentence that deviates from those
norms suggests that judges already employ this approach. See King & Wright, supra note
14, at 341-42, 374-76, 388.
700 [Vol. 51:693
"CLIENTLESS" PROSECUTORS
an information-generating and information-forcing role.2 7 In these
instances, the judge should express her concerns on the record in
open court and ask the prosecutor to justify her decision. That
record would help direct information to supervisors in the
prosecutor's office and improve the direct political check on
prosecutors by providing fodder for electoral challengers and more
information to voters.
Because ex post fairness review comes late in a very opaque
plea bargaining process after the parties have already reached a
deal and the judge has every incentive to go along to clear her
docket, it may not be sufficiently robust to protect the public-
client's interests. It also comes after prosecutors may have already
used their substantial leverage to obtain a guilty plea, perhaps
using sources of leverage that do not best embody prosecutors' role
as ministers of justice who should assure fair process for
defendants. Thus, this Article briefly considers ways that judges
can monitor prosecutors-both to ensure that they are protecting
their client's interests and that they are affording basic procedural
fairness to defendantS28-during (and indeed before) plea
bargaining.29
This Article theorizes a broader role that judges should play in
approving plea bargains. But its practical aim is modest:
encouraging judges, despite docket management pressures, to look
carefully at the criminal cases before them and make noise when
they see cause for concern about prosecutors over or under-
reaching. It does not suggest added ritual but simply urges
conscientious judges to employ their judgment and expertise. In
some respects, this proposal is a second (or perhaps third) best
solution. Legislatures reining in prosecutors' incredibly powerful
27 See infra Section IV.A.4.b.
28 There is reason to think that protecting defendants' rights serves the prosecutor's public-
client well even if rights protection would not embody the actual majoritarian preferences in a
particular community. See Gold, Beyond the Judicial Fourth Amendment, supra note 7, at
1642; Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors "Seek Justice"?, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 607,
642 (1999). Regardless of whether protecting defendants' procedural rights is seen as serving
the prosecutor's public-client's interests or prosecutors' obligations in some other respect, that
remains the prosecutor's task. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.8 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR
ASS'N 2016); ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION
§ 3-1.2 (4th ed. 2015).
29 See infra Section W.B.
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tools to obtain guilty pleas, such as by shrinking the scope of
substantive criminal law and prosecutors' menu of charging and
sentencing options, would also reduce prosecutor accountability
concerns.30 Better funding public defender offices to provide a
stronger adversarial check would too.3 1 But neither reform seems
politically feasible, which prompts the turn to judges as a more
modest solution.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part II briefly explains the
comparison between prosecutors and class counsel.32 Part III then
explains the vast differences in the judicial role between the two
systems regarding negotiated resolutions-class settlements and
plea bargains. Part IV then considers the implications of the
comparison, focusing on judges conducting substantive fairness
review of plea agreements. Part IV also briefly considers other
opportunities for judicial involvement if ex post fairness review
alone is not sufficiently robust.
II. EXPLAINING THE COMPARISON
The most important similarity between class counsel and
prosecutors is what I call their "clientless" nature. Both are
lawyers with diffuse clients comprised primarily of individuals
who are rationally apathetic about their cases and therefore
cannot be expected to monitor their lawyers directly.33 Class
counsel represents the class-client as a whole rather than the
interests of particular class members.34  Somewhat similarly,
'1 See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV.
505, 546-57 (2001) (explaining legislatures' institutional incentives to delegate broad power
to prosecutors); William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law's Disappearing
Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2548, 2555-58 (2004) (explaining how much power legislatures
have given prosecutors through broad and deep substantive law); infra Part IV.A.4.
31 See William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and
Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 7-12 (1997) (discussing the disparity in funding changes
between public defenders' offices and prosecutors' offices).
32 A more complete explanation can be found in Gold, Clientless Lawyers, supra note 1.
3 I do not mean to suggest that comparing class counsel and prosecutors is more useful
than comparisons of other "clientless" lawyers and plan to expand the frame of the
comparison in future work.
3 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee's note to 2003 amendment; see also, e.g.,
Howard M. Erichson, Coattail Class Actions: Reflections on Microsoft, Tobacco, and the
Mixing of Public and Private Lawyering in Mass Litigation, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 3
702 [Vol. 51:693
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prosecutors represent the public as a whole rather than the
interests of particular victims. 35 The identity of the class-client
and public-client are not exactly the same, of course. But class
counsel, like the prosecutor, is the one calling the shots and
making the key decisions on behalf of her client who cannot voice
its own interests.3 6 Unlike the traditional model of lawyer-client
representation in which the client holds ultimate authority over
the decision of whether to settle a case and on what terms,37 class
counsel can settle claims regardless of whether the named
plaintiffs or absent class members object, so long as the court finds
that the proposed settlement is fair.38
Both clients have complex and amorphous goals that require
difficult balancing, however, and that task necessarily falls to their
lawyers in the first instance. Although the clients' goals are not
identical in the two contexts, they are sometimes more similar
than people realize.39 In criminal law, prosecutors are tasked with
considering victims' interests and seeking restitution on their
(2000) ("Class action lawyers are duty-bound to represent the interests of the particular
class . . . .").
11 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION § 3-1.3
(4th ed. 2015); Green & Zacharias, supra note 3, at 861-62.
36 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiffs Attorney: The Implications of
Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 669, 677-78 (1986) (explaining that a class action attorney "has no 'true'
identifiable client" and thus is given more control over the litigation); Deborah L. Rhode,
Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1183, 1183 (1982) ("In many such cases,
the lawyer represents an aggregation of litigants with unstable, inchoate, or conflicting
preferences. The more diffuse and divided the class, the greater the problems in defining its
objectives."); see also Samuel Issacharoff & Richard A. Nagareda, Class Settlements Under
Attack, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1649, 1695 (2008) ("In many class actions, there is little realistic
prospect of individual class members playing an active role, either in monitoring class
counsel or pursuing their own interests independently.").
37 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.2(a) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2016).
3 See Lazy Oil Co. v. Witco Corp., 166 F.3d 581, 584, 588-91 (3d Cir. 1999). The notion
that class counsel can settle claims over the objections of absent class members is built into
the structure of the rule that allows for objectors' voices to be heard in a public fairness
hearing before a judicial decision on the proposed settlement. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2),
(e)(5).
3 This is because, as David Sklansky and Stephen Yeazell have persuasively argued,
criminal law is not purely public law nor is civil litigation purely private law. Sklansky &
Yeazell, supra note 9, at 701-04.
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behalf;40 restitution and concern for particular victims are private-
law concerns that look a lot like civil redress.41 And indeed, the
scope of restitution in criminal law can be so large as to look
remarkably similar to aggregate civil litigation.42
Much as criminal law shares the private-law concern about
restitution, so too does class action law share public-law concerns
about deterring wrongdoing. The primary social welfarist reason
to have class actions is their deterrent effect-protecting the public
from future harm by forcing decisionmakers to internalize
externalities and not allowing companies to avoid the fear of
liability by spreading harm thinly across a large group.43
Prosecutors face more internally-divergent client interests than
do class counsel, but the class-client's interests-like the
prosecutor's public-client's-are not homogenous.44 The Supreme
Court has required increasing similarity between class members
in the past two decades,45 but classes can still be certified with
internal conflicts as to core preferences such as risk tolerances,
discount rates for recovery, levels of animosity toward the
defendant for conduct related or unrelated to the lawsuit, desires
for public acknowledgement of wrongdoing, desires for information
regarding the underlying conduct, and desires to continue a
4 See 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(5)-<6) (2012); 5 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 11, § 21.3(f (describing
the widespread adoption of victims' bill of rights); Adam S. Zimmerman & David M. Jaros, The
Criminal Class Action, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1385, 1393 (2011).
41 I do not mean to suggest that the label or the stigma of a criminal conviction does not
matter. Rather, the point is that the same concerns animate criminal restitution as civil
relief.
To some extent, efforts at restorative justice in criminal law also show deep concern
with the private-law aspects of criminal law because they focus on relations between the
victim and perpetrator. See Sklansky & Yeazell, supra note 9, at 701-02, 738.
42 See Zimmerman & Jaros, supra note 40, at 1385 (noting that prosecutors have sought
billions of dollars in restitution and distributed the money to victims much like a civil class
action). Tellingly, Adam Zimmerman and David Jaros refer to such cases as "criminal class
actions."
43 See infra note 105 and accompanying text.
44 For more detail regarding this similarity, see Gold, "Clientless" Lawyers, supra note 1,
at 97-102.
45 See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, The Misguided Search for Class Unity, 82 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 651, 687 (2014) ("[I]t appears that courts have required a stronger degree of
cohesiveness for (b)(2) classes after Amchem."); Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class
Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 729, 774 (2013) ("The Supreme Court's Dukes decision appears
to have given new meaning to commonality.").
704 [Vol. 51:693
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relationship with the defendant;46 at least a few class members
demonstrate these different preferences in many cases by actively
opposing a proposed settlement. A single prosecutor's public-client
includes defendants, victims, those who seek less use of the
criminal justice system, and those who want to lock more people
up and throw away the key.
Concern about the complexity of client interests is compounded
in both contexts because the lawyers have powerful self-interests
at play that may diverge from the client's interests, as scholars on
both sides of the civil-criminal divide have recognized. Class
action scholars typically worry that class counsel will underreach
and sell out the class's claims too cheaply or after expending too
little effort; the idea is that class counsel will tend to be more risk
averse than the client because class counsel has to front the costs
of litigation.47 Prosecutors have career-driven self-interests that
favor creating splashy headlines, being viewed as tough on crime,
and pleading out cases as quickly and easily as possible.48
Moreover, because of the nature of their work, prosecutors
"ordinarily are naturally aligned with the police and victims."49
The typical concern about prosecutor misalignment with the
client's interest is one of overreach.50 In some instances, such as
those involving police defendants5 1 or deferred prosecution
46 Cf. Rhode, supra note 36, at 1183, 1185-91 (discussing the wide number of internal
conflicts that can arise within a structural reform class action).
47 See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & John D. Currivan, Improving on the Contingent Fee, 63
CORNELL L. REV. 529, 536 (1978) (explaining that a class is best served by a lawyer devoting
a large number of hours to ensure maximum recovery but that class counsel is better served
by working a smaller number of hours); Christopher R. Leslie, A Market-Based Approach to
Coupon Settlements in Antitrust and Consumer Class Action Litigation, 49 UCLA L. REV.
991, 1042 (2002) (noting that "even when a trial would increase the net recovery for class
members, class counsel can maximize its rate of return by avoiding trial and settling early"
because class counsel fronts litigation costs with no guarantee of recovery).
48 Gold, "Clientless" Lawyers, supra note 1, at 104-11.
49 Green & Zacharias, supra note 8, at 863.
50 See Gold, "Clientless"Lawyers, upra note 1, at 104-11; see also, e.g., Brian A. Sun, The
Overzealous Prosecutor, LITIG., Winter 1992, at 38, 38-40 (noting reasons that prosecutors
may overreach).
51 See, e.g., Kate Levine, How We Prosecute the Police, 104 GEO. L.J. 745, 749 (2016)




agreements with large fines that provide splashy headlines,52
concerns arise about prosecutor underreach because of these same
self-interests.
One meaningful difference between the two systems is the
complicated role of the prosecutor to respect defendants' rights and
embody her constituents' preferences. Class counsel's job should
be to pursue cases in ways that best serve her class-client's
interests.53 While figuring out what best serves the class-client's
interests is a challenging task, few would suggest that class
counsel owes allegiance to promote anyone else's interests. The
same is not true for prosecutors. Prosecutors should embody their
constituents' majoritarian preferences in some respects. But
prosecutors' role as constitutional actors with substantial power to
determine which citizens should be deprived of their liberty
creates other obligations, such as ensuring fairness for defendants
that may not always be popular amongst prosecutors'
constituencies.5 4 The crucial similarity is that in neither class
actions nor criminal law can we expect clients to meaningfully
monitor their lawyers; both can accordingly look to the other to
borrow additional mechanisms that substitute for client control.
The difference explored in this paragraph, however, means that
holding prosecutors accountable requires more than trying to
ensure that they adhere to the actual preferences of their
constituents; it requires judges instead to consider whether
prosecutors are amply serving some more abstract notion of the
public's interest and whether prosecutors are abiding by their
obligation to serve as ministers of justice. Monitoring whether
prosecutors are adequately protecting the interests of justice is a
52 See generally David M. Uhlmann, Deferred Prosecution and Non-Prosecution
Agreements and the Erosion of Corporate Criminal Liability, 72 MD. L. REV. 1295 (2013)
(arguing that the dramatic increase in deferred prosecutions for corporate criminal liability
erodes trust in the criminal justice system and undermines the rule of law).
53 See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
4 Sometimes embodying majoritarian preferences runs in tension with prosecutors'
obligations to do justice, including affording fairness to defendants. See Stephen J.
Schulhofer, Due Process of Sentencing, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 733, 803 (1980) (explaining that




task with less than obvious contours,55 but it includes at least
trying not to convict the innocent and ensuring that defendants
receive fair process.56
Although one instinct may be to say that every prosecutor's
constituents desire the prosecutor to lock up as many people as
possible for as long as possible, those constituents have to pay for
the law enforcement they get. Thus, even leaving aside concerns
about criminogenic sentences and the notion that more cost might
mean marginal safety decreases, a greater sentence than
necessary wastes public money.57
Thus, although class counsel and prosecutors are not identical,
they share several important similarities. They both represent
diffuse entities comprised primarily of apathetic individuals who
are unlikely to meaningfully monitor their lawyers. Yet both cases
involve lawyers whose interests tend to diverge from their clients'.
Thus, both contexts raise significant concerns about lawyer
accountability and prompt the need to look outside the lawyer-
client relationship to hold the lawyers accountable.
Some readers might be tempted to say that the adversarial
process provides a sufficient check on lawyers in both contexts,
rendering judicial review unnecessary. It doesn't, albeit for
different reasons in the two systems. Class counsel will typically
be checked by its well-resourced corporate-defendant adversary,
making judicial review largely unnecessary to protect against
overreach. Instead, judicial review in class actions is meant to
56 See R. Michael Cassidy, Character and Context: What Virtue Theory Can Teach Us
About a Prosecutor's Ethical Duty to "Seek Justice," 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 635, 638 (2006);
Rory K. Little, "It's Not My Problem?" Wrong: Prosecutors Have an Important Ethical Role to
Play, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 685, 688 (2010).
6 See, e.g., Gold, Beyond the Judicial Fourth Amendment, supra note 7, at 1643-44
(arguing that the minister of justice duty includes protecting citizens' constitutional rights);
Green, supra note 28, at 634 (defining the minister of justice duty to mean "avoiding
punishment of those who are innocent of criminal wrongdoing .. . and affording the
accused, and others, a lawful, fair process"); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r.
3.8 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2016) (explaining that prosecutors have "specific obligations to see
that the defendant is accorded procedural justice").
57 See generally Russell M. Gold, Promoting Democracy in Prosecution, 86 WASH. L. REV.
69 (2011) [hereinafter Gold, Promoting Democracy in Prosecution] (arguing for efficiency in
prosecution, meaning that cases should be prosecuted when their marginal benefits exceed
or equal their marginal costs including incarceration).
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protect against underreach.58  In criminal law, the primary
concern with prosecutors not tracking their public-clients' best
interests tends to be (though is not always) about prosecutor
overreach. But there are structural reasons why the adversarial
process fails to check that overreach. The typical enforcement
target is an indigent individual who is represented by an
overstretched and under-resourced public defender.59 Defendants
who opt to go to trial face harsh trial penalties, and the accused
frequently sit in jail while their case awaits resolution.60
Accordingly, resource constraints and money bail create reasons to
doubt the ability of the adversarial process to check prosecutor
overreach.
58 The comparison also reveals that class counsel in some contexts may overreach in
seeking to represent the class's interests in ways that scholars have not previously
recognized. Although a detailed analysis of this point is beyond the scope of this Article, the
basic idea is that the defendant will serve as an ample check against overreach, but the
class's interests may be poorly served when class counsel overreaches and a defendant
successfully blocks that overreach.
59 Green, supra note 28, at 626 (explaining that prosecutors' "typical adversaries are
among society's most powerless"); Peter A. Joy & Rodney J. Uphoff, Systemic Barriers to
Effective Assistance of Counsel in Plea Bargaining, 99 IOWA L. REV. 2103, 2112-13 n.52
(2014) (relying on an empirical study of workload to conclude that "[fjor indigent
defendants ... too many are represented by an inexperienced or overwhelmed lawyer with a
crushing caseload that prevents counsel from doing anything more on a case than a cursory
interview and the presentation of the prosecutor's plea offer"); Rinat Kitai-Sangero, Plea
Bargaining as Dialogue, 49 AKRON L. REV. 63, 78 (2016) (noting that "[d]isparity of power
between the prosecutor and the accused is inherent in the criminal process" because of,
among other reasons, resource disparities); Ion Meyn, The Lightness of the Prosecutor's
Burden 15-24 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (explaining the significant
resource disparity between prosecutors and public defenders).
6o See Peter A. Joy & Kevin C. McMunigal, Innocent Defendants Pleading Guilty, 30
CRIM. JUST. 45, 45-46 (2015) (arguing that "the difference between the potential sentence a
defendant faces after a trial and the sentence the same defendant faces after a guilty
plea ... plac[es] an unfairly high price on defendants exercising the constitutional right to a
jury trial"); Rakoff, supra note 7 (contending that "the consequences of going to trial ... are
too severe to take the risk"); Frontline: The Plea (PBS television broadcast June 17, 2004),
http://video.pbs.org/video/2216784391/ (explaining the pressures that face even innocent
defendants to plead guilty when the sentence would result in immediate release from jail).
Detaining many defendant who have never been convicted of a crime is itself a major
concern that I take up elsewhere. See Russell M. Gold, Jail as Interim Relief (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author); see also Shawn Carter, Jay Z: For Father's Day, I'm
Taking on the Exploitative Bail Industry, TIME, June 16, 2017, http://time.com/4821547/jay-
z-racism-bail-bonds (articulating the massive scope of pretrial detention and extensive
harms that pretrial detention can cause).
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III. COMPARING THE JUDICIAL ROLES IN NEGOTIATED
RESOLUTIONS
One perplexing aspect of the comparison between accountability
measures in criminal prosecution and class actions is the
cavernous divide in reliance on judges to monitor lawyers,
especially as to negotiated resolutions of cases. Class counsel has
significant discretion, but that discretion is checked by judges in
every case in which class counsel tries to bind more than a few
named individuals.6 1 In criminal law, prosecutorial discretion is
vast,6 2 widely recognized, and rarely checked by judges.63
A. CLASS ACTIONS
Class action law relies heavily on judicial review to protect the
class's interests.64 If a damages class action is not resolved in the
defendant's favor on a procedural motion and a class is certified,
61 See Gold, "Clientless" Lawyers, supra note 1, at 113-16.
62 See, e.g., Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. &
CRIINOLOGY 3, 3 (1940) ("The prosecutor has more control over life, liberty, and reputation
than any other person in America. His discretion is tremendous."); Stephen J. Schulhofer,
Criminal Justice Discretion as a Regulatory System, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 43, 43 (1988) ("In
criminal justice, as perhaps nowhere else in the American legal system, the life and liberty
of the citizen are exposed to the largely uncontrolled discretion of individual public officials.
Prosecutors have unlimited discretion not to charge, and when they do proceed, they have
largely unlimited power to determine which charges to file."); William J. Stuntz, The
Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 506 (2001) (labeling
prosecutors as "the criminal justice system's real lawmakers"). The vastness of
prosecutorial discretion has led to widespread acceptance of the notion that American
criminal justice is a largely administrative system run by prosecutors. See generally Gerard
E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2117 (1998).
6 See Barkow, supra note 6, at 871; Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the
Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989, 1024-28 (2006) [hereinafter Barkow, Separation of
Powers] (explaining the lack of oversight on decisionmaking by federal prosecutors).
6 See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing
Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 884 (1987) ("The
members of the plaintiff class usually have very little capacity to monitor their agents.");
Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Judicial Review of Class Action Settlements, 1 J.
LEGAL ANALYSIS 167, 167 (2009) ("Judicial scrutiny over settlements is the most important
safeguard against inadequate or conflicted representation by class counsel."); Richard A.
Nagareda, Turning from Tort to Administration, 94 MICH. L. REV. 899, 902 (1996) ("The idea
is that judicial review may substitute for the direct monitoring of counsel by the client, as is
typical in traditional litigation on behalf of an individual plaintiff.").
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the case will typically settle.6 5 Class settlements can be approved
only if a judge determines that several procedural requirements
for class certification are satisfied and,66 substantively, that the
settlement is "fair, reasonable, and adequate" after a hearing.67
Some of these procedural requirements, though malleable, seek to
protect the rights of the absent class members. A class cannot be
certified if the claims or defenses of the putative class
representatives do not align well with those of the absent class
members68-a requirement that seeks to ensure that flaws in the
class representatives' claims are not held against the absent class
members. A class cannot be certified if its members have
intractable conflicts of interest, such as the conflicts between those
who have already been injured and those whose harm has not yet
manifested.69 A class cannot be certified unless the court finds
that class counsel will "fairly and adequately represent the
interests of the class."7 0 Further, a class cannot be certified unless
the number of claimants is sufficiently numerous that individual
joinder is impracticable.7 '
65 See Brian T. Fitzpatrick, An Empirical Study of Class Action Settlements and Their Fee
Awards, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 811, 812 (2010).
66 See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997) (requiring that
certification of a class action for purposes of settlement meet the same standards as
certification of a class action for litigation purposes); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)-(b)
(specifying the requirements for class certification).
67 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2). Courts have expounded on these factors in a variety of different
ways, and the advisory committee has proposed a rule change to focus courts' attention on the
most important of these considerations. COMMITEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF APPELLATE, BANKRUPTCY, CIVIL, AND CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE, AUGUST 2016, at 213-14, http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2016-08-preli
minarydraftofrules-forms-publ ished for publiccommentO.pdf [hereinafter PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS].
68 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3).
69 See id. at 23(a)(4) (providing that putative class representatives must "fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class"); Amchem, 521 U.S. at 625 ("The adequacy
inquiry under Rule 23(a)(4) serves to uncover conflicts of interest between named parties
and the class they seek to represent.").
70 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(4); see also id. at 23(g)(1) (requiring the court to appoint class
counsel).
71 Id. at 23(a)(1). There are other procedural hurdles to class certification, but they
largely serve to protect judicial economy or the defendant's interest in finality. See id. at
23(a)(2) (requiring commonality); id. (b)(3) (requiring predominance and superiority).
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To help facilitate judicial review of these requirements, class
members are entitled to notice when a class is certified and of any
proposed settlement.72  They may object to the fairness of a
settlement and seek to dissuade judicial approval.73
The parties must also notify relevant state and federal
executive branch officials of proposed settlements so that those
officials may object on their constituents' behalf.7 4
Consider a concrete example of a Fair Credit Reporting Act
class action where-as is common-a class has not yet been
certified when the parties ask the court to approve a settlement.
Once the lawyers reached a deal, they jointly moved for class
certification and preliminary approval of settlement.75 In their
motion papers, they detailed the "arms'-length mediation and
negotiation process" including naming the mediator and describing
the number of communications exchanged between the parties.76
In this particular example, the parties did not provide excruciating
detail regarding the number of pages or the size of the data
exchanged in discovery.77 The court preliminarily approved the
settlement and ordered that notice be given to the absent class
72 Id. at 23(c)(2)(B), (e)(1). Notice requirements are different for other types of class
actions, but this Article focuses on Rule 23(b)(3) damages class actions.
73 Id. at 23(e)(5).
7 28 U.S.C. § 1715(b) (2012); see also Samuel Issacharoff, The Governance Problem in
Aggregate Litigation, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3165, 3179 (2013) (explaining the intended effect
of CAFA notice provision); Alexandra D. Lahav, Two Views of the Class Action, 79 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1939, 1952 (2011) ("The risk that the class counsel would not live up to the public
trust spurred a provision in CAFA requiring notice of class action settlements to
appropriate state and federal officials.").
75 See Motion for Preliminary Approval of Settlement and Certification of a Settlement
Class at 1, Brown v. Lowe's Cos., Nos. 5:13-CV-00079-RLV-DSC, 5:15-CV-00018-RLV-DSC
(W.D.N.C. Dec. 7, 2015), ECF No. 96.
16 Memorandum of Law in Support of Joint Motion for Preliminary Approval of
Settlement and Certification of a Settlement Class at 4, Brown, Nos. 5:13-CV-00079-RLV-
DSC, 5:15-CV-00018-RLV-DSC (W.D.N.C. Dec. 7, 2015), ECF No. 97.
7 See id. at 13 (explaining that the plaintiffs "did not agree to the settlement until their
counsel ... had litigated the matter for some time and had analyzed significant documents
and information both obtained through their own efforts and produced by the defendants").
By comparison, see Stipulation of Settlement at 4, Pappas v. Naked Juice Co. of Glendora,
Inc., No. LA CV 11-08276-JAK (PLAx) (C.D. Cal. July 2, 2013), ECF No. 118 (providing
detailed information regarding 75,000 pages and one Terabyte of data produced, numbers of
written responses to discovery requests, and lists of actions such as litigating discovery
motions, working with experts, and testing of products).
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members.7 8 The lawyers then notified the relevant federal and
state government officials and the absent class members.79 A few
class members filed objections, and a small portion of the class
opted out.8 0 After the court held a fairness hearing in which any
class member who objected could be heard,81 the court approved
the settlement and certified the class.82
B. CRIMINAL LAW
Prosecutors' charging discretion is treated as nearly absolute in
the federal system, save for the theoretical limit that charges
cannot be brought based intentionally on a suspect's race.83
Criminal codes are broad and overlapping, which leaves
prosecutors with a significant menu of options from which to
choose when charging a case.84 And because the vast majority of
cases will be resolved by guilty plea, prosecutors, without recourse,
charge serious crimes that most constitutionally-sensitive people
78 Order Granting Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement at 1-2, Brown, Nos.
5:13-CV-00079-RLV-DSC, 5:15-CV-00018-RLV-DSC (W.D.N.C. Feb. 26, 2016), ECF No. 105.
7 See Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Final Approval of Class
Action Settlement at 14-16, Brown, Nos. 5:13-CV-00079-RLV-DSC, 5:15-CV-00018-RLV-DSC
(W.D.N.C. May 15, 2010), ECF No. 128; Defendant Lowe's Companies, Inc.'s Certification of
Notice of Mailing Notice of Proposed Settlement, Brown, Nos. 5:13-CV-00079-RLV-DSC, 5:15-
CV-00018-RLV-DSC (W.D.N.C. Dec. 18, 2015), ECF No. 98 & 98-1.
80 Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Final Approval of Class
Action Settlement at 3, Brown, Nos. 5:13-CV-00079-RLV-DSC, 5:15-CV-00018-RLV-DSC
(W.D.N.C. May 23, 2016), ECF No. 128.
81 Minute Entry: Settlement Conference for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement,
Brown, Nos. 5:13-CV-00079-RLV-DSC, 5:15-CV-00018-RLV-DSC (W.D.N.C. June 6, 2016),
ECF No. 136.
82 Order Granting Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement, at 2-3, Brown,
No. 5:13-CV-00079-RLV-DSC (W.D.N.C. June 21, 2016), ECF No. 137.
83 See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464-65 (1996) (holding that courts
should check prosecutors' charging discretion only when it violates equal protection by
purposely discriminating against a suspect class); see also Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation,
supra note 7, at 970 ("Courts nominally forbid selective prosecution based on race. No race-
based claim has succeeded for more than a century, however.").
8 Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Power, Discretion, and Misconduct, 23
CRIM. JUST. 24, 28 (2008); Lynch, supra note 62, at 2136-37; Stuntz, supra note 62, at 512-
19. That elected legislatures create this wide and deep net for prosecutors might suggest
some popular legitimacy to the approach, but William Stuntz's excellent explanation of
legislatures' institutional incentives discredits that notion. See id. at 529-33, 546-57.
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would think inappropriate to use as a lever in plea bargaining.85
Indeed, sometimes even the prosecutor herself may not wish for
the defendant to be sentenced on the charges levied.86 Lack of
judicial review of prosecutors' decisions is typically defended based
on separation of powers concerns, but separation of powers need
not foreclose all judicial involvement.8 7
Judges retain some power to impose an appropriate sentence no
matter what sentence the parties suggest, but that power is
severely constrained by prosecutors' ability to charge
enhancements or mandatory minimums that impose a floor on the
resulting sentence and on inertial forces that favor judges
approving the parties' agreed-upon sentencing recommendations.8 8
And even when there is no mandatory sentence driven by the
charging decision, the parties may choose a take-it-or-leave-it plea
85 This sort of charge bargaining is quite controversial. Compare Ronald Wright & Marc
Miller, Honesty and Opacity in Charge Bargains, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1409, 1410-11 (2003)
[hereinafter Wright & Miller, Honesty and Opacity] (criticizing the "pervasive harm" of
"charge bargains due to their special lack of transparency" and the ability that they afford
prosecutors to "eliminate virtually all access to trials for defendants" by creating "extreme
sentence differentials"), and Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining
Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L. REV. 29, 111-13 (2002) [hereinafter Wright & Miller,
Screening/Bargaining TradeoffJ (explaining concerns with charge bargaining and arguing
that lead prosecutors should curtail it), with Gerard E. Lynch, Screening Versus Plea
Bargaining: Exactly What Are We Trading Off?, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1399, 1403-04 (2003)
(viewing charge bargaining as the result of prosecutors carefully considering evidence
presented by defense counsel and evaluating the appropriate charges as a result).
86 See Kyle Graham, Overcharging, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 701, 704-05 (2014) ("[In both
types ofj overcharging, the prosecutor originally alleges a charge or charges that she
subjectively does not want to pursue to conviction, or is at least indifferent about
prosecuting. Instead, the extraneous or unduly severe allegations are put forward to
incentivize the defendant o plead guilty to another charge or charges.").
87 See Darryl K. Brown, Judicial Power to Regulate Plea Bargaining, 57 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1225, 1253 (2016) ('"There are good reasons to question the strong conception of
separation of powers doctrine in the federal context, where it prohibits meaningful judicial
oversight of prosecutorial discretion about filing, amending, or dismissing charges. That
kind of constitutional barrier has an even weaker basis in many states . . . ."); see also id. at
1232-42 (explaining a much more complex history of federal prosecution than would
support the story that separation of powers requires complete deference to the executive
branch); id. at 1242-53 (explaining the even less compelling case in the states for a rigid bar
on judicial involvement in charging decisions).
88 See Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation, supra note 7, at 971 (explaining that prosecutors
have the "dominant role in setting sentences" because of mandatory minimums and
overlapping crimes); Richard A. Bierschbach & Stephanos Bibas, Notice-and-Comment
Sentencing, 97 MrNN. L. REV. 1, 8-9, 11 (2012) (describing how prosecutors control
sentencing outcomes through charging and charge bargaining).
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agreement where the parties' sentencing recommendation binds
the court unless it rejects the agreement entirely.89
In many state courts, mandatory minimums and sentencing
enhancements afford similar power to prosecutors.90 And it is the
rare-albeit quite interesting-case to find courts setting aside
that broad discretion.91
Guilty pleas are subject to some judicial review, but that review
is not designed to ensure that the prosecutor has faithfully
represented her client. It is designed to protect defendants. It
thus provides an instance of judges monitoring prosecutors'
performance of their constitutional duties, but it is largely
ineffectual.92  The judge's role is to ensure that the plea is
knowingly and voluntarily entered-meaning that the defendant
understands the rights she is waiving.93 But that procedural
89 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1)(C); see also Jeremy Sternberg & Christopher laquinto, The
Future of Corporate Criminal Pleas Under Rule 11(c)(1)(C), 28 CRIM. JUST., Winter 2014, at
12, 13 (explaining that district courts rejecting take-it-or-leave-it pleas "seems to be more
the exception than the rule").
90 R. Michael Cassidy, (Ad)ministering Justice: A Prosecutor's Ethical Duty to Support
Sentencing Reform, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 981, 983-89 (2014); see also 6 LAFAVE ET AL., supra
note 11, § 26.3(c) ("By 1994, all fiffy states had enacted one or more mandatory sentencing
laws .... [P]rosecutors for the most part have remained free to circumvent mandatory
minimums through initial charging and charge bargaining."). For an excellent description
of a scheme where prosecutors held all of the sentencing power, see Ronald F. Wright,
Sentencing Commissions as Provocateurs of Prosecutorial Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM. L.
REV. 1010, 1030 (2005) (detailing how "the drug laws in [New Jersey] grant[ed] exceptional
authority to prosecutors," at least before the courts-quite unusually-substantially
modified the regime); see also Alschuler, supra note 7, at 1063 (explaining that "the task of
sentencing in guilty-plea cases had been transferred from the courts to the District
Attorney's office" in some of the jurisdictions the author visited).
91 New Jersey provides a particularly interesting example of judges going far outside the
norm to rebalance judicial authority vis-it-vis prosecutors to create uniformity in sentencing.
See Ronald F. Wright, Prosecutorial Guidelines and the New Terrain in New Jersey, 109 PENN
ST. L. REV. 1087, 1092-98 (2005) (explaining the initial allocation of vast power to prosecutors
in deciding whether to charge enhancements, uch as whether a drug crime occurred in
proximity to a school, and detailing the case law forcibly reallocating authority through a
typical administrative law scheme); Wright, supra note 90, at 1030-32 (same).
92 See Brown, supra note 87, at 1231 ("American plea bargaining is highly-probably
uniquely-'deregulated.'").
9 See McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969) (explaining that guilty pleas
violate due process unless they are knowingly and voluntarily entered); Anne R. Traum,
Using Outcomes to Reframe Guilty Plea Adjudication, 66 FLA. L. REV. 823, 827-28 (2014)
("[Clourt oversight is typically limited to determining whether the defendant understands
the terms of the deal he is accepting and the rights he is waiving."); see also FED. R. CRIM. P.
11(b)(1)-(b)(2) (specifying requirements in federal court for ensuring that the defendant's
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prohibition on involuntary pleas is not as powerful as many might
think. Neither dangling a death sentence over a defendant's head,
threatening another more serious charge, nor threatening to
prosecute a family member if the defendant refuses to plead guilty
renders a plea involuntary.94 Substantively, the court must ensure
only "that there is a factual basis for the plea,"95 which is an
extremely lenient standard that does not inquire whether the
charges best serve the public's interests.96 Ensuring that the
prosecutor has struck a deal that serves the public's interests is
not part of the analysis,97 except insofar as the public's and
defendant's interests align in preventing a defendant from waiving
plea is voluntary and that the defendant understands the rights she is waiving); Stephanos
Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor to Consumer
Protection, 99 CAL. L. REV. 1117, 1142 (2011) [hereinafter Bibas, Regulating the Plea-
Bargaining Market] (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 11) ("Far from actively managing the plea-
bargaining process, judges are passive and reactive. They can neither investigate nor
advise about the tactics and merits of pleas.").
9 Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 358-59, 365 (1978) (holding that a prosecutor's
threat to impose a drastic sentencing enhancement if the defendant did not plead guilty did
not violate due process); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 751, 755 (1970) (concluding
that the threat of death penalty did not render a guilty plea compelled and thus did not
violate due process); Brown, supra note 87, at 1231 ("[P]rosecutors can act strategically and
add charges solely if a defendant insists on trial, and they can pressure defendants by
leveraging circumstances such as limited defense resources, pretrial detention that disrupts
work and family obligations, or the threat of prosecution against family members if
defendants refuse to plead guilty." (footnotes omitted)); see also Cynthia Alkon, Hard
Bargaining in Plea Bargaining: When Do Prosecutors Cross the Line?, 17 NEV. L.J. 401, 407
(2017) ("prosecutorial hard bargaining tactics are routine"). For more on prosecutors' "hard
bargaining" plea negotiation tactics, see id. at 406-13.
95 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(3); see also 5 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 11, § 21.4(f) (explaining
that many states have adopted a provision comparable to the federal rule).
96 See supra note 12; see also Ion Meyn, The Unbearable Lightness of Criminal Procedure,
42 AM. J. CRIM. L. 39, 72-73 (2014) (quoting the typical plea colloquy by one Magistrate Judge
in the Northern District of Iowa and using it as an example of rote, surface-level inquiry).
97 The Sentencing Guidelines afford federal judges authority to reject a plea agreement in
which the prosecutor has bargained away charges that sufficiently reflect the seriousness of
the defendant's conduct. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6B1.2(a) (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM'N 2004); see also United States v. Fine, 975 F.2d 596, 601 (9th Cir. 1992) ('The purpose
of the 6B.2(a) plea bargaining standard is to avoid inappropriate lenience."). This provision
means little in practice though. See, e.g., United States v. Ammidown, 497 F.2d 615, 617 (D.C.
Cir. 1973) (reversing the district court in "this unusual case" where the district court rejected a
charge bargain because the resulting charges were too lenient).
A limited exception to judges not considering the public's interest appears with deferred
prosecution agreements. See, e.g., United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., No. 12-CR-763,
2013 WL 3306161, at *1-8 (E.D.N.Y. July 1, 2013) (holding that courts have authority to
approve or eject a deferred prosecution agreement after reviewing its substance).
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constitutional rights without at least a rudimentary
understanding of those rights or because of coercion.98
One place where rules and courts have shown skepticism of plea
deals and sought to protect the public's interests are nolo contendere
pleas in which defendants refuse to admit wrongdoing and Alford
pleas in which the defendant denies wrongdoing.99 With nolo
contendere pleas, federal courts are required to consider whether
allowing a guilty plea without an admission of guilt serves the
public's interest.100 Alford permitted but did not require state
courts to accept guilty pleas when defendants maintain their
innocence,101 and courts in a few states have declined the
invitation.102 In other states, the scope of permissible Alford pleas
is construed quite narrowly.103 This skepticism of Alford and nolo
pleas to preserve the legitimacy of the criminal justice system
requires courts to take a fairly active role in ensuring that most
defendants are not incarcerated without either an admission of guilt
or a finding by a factfinder.104 But Alford and nolo pleas provide
98 This is not to suggest that courts actually prevent coerced guilty pleas but instead that
coercing guilty pleas violates prosecutors' minister of justice duty.
9 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37-39 (1970) (holding that a guilty plea is not
invalid even when coupled with the defendant's protestations of innocence).
100 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(a)(3).
1o1 See Alford, 400 U.S. at 38 n.11 ("[T]he States may bar their courts from accepting
guilty pleas from any defendants who assert their innocence.").
102 See Ross v. State, 456 N.E.2d 420, 423 (Ind. 1983) ("[A] judge may not accept a plea of
guilty when the defendant both pleads guilty and maintains his innocence at the same
time."); State v. Korzenowski, 303 A.2d 596, 597 n.1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1973)
("[N]otwithstanding the recent decision in North Carolina v. Alford. . ., except in capital
cases, a plea shall not be accepted from a defendant who does not admit commission of the
offense."). But see McGuyton v. State, 782 S.E.2d 21, 23 (Ga. 2016) (holding that a trial
court may accept a guilty plea, even if the defendant maintains innocence, "[s]o long as [the]
defendant intelligently concludes that his interests require entry of a guilty plea and the
record before the judge contains strong evidence of actual guilt" (quotation omitted)).
103 See Sydney Schneider, Comment, When Innocent Defendants Falsely Confess: Analyzing
the Ramifications of Entering Alford Pleas in the Context of the Burgeoning Innocence
Movement, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 279, 283-84 (2013) ("[S]tates such as North
Carolina, Washington, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin construed Alford pleas very narrowly.").
104 See, e.g., People v. Hill, 946 N.E.2d 169, 171 (N.Y. 2011) (explaining that Alford pleas
are-and should be-rare while reversing an Alford plea because of the lack of evidence
that the defendant understood the nature of an Alford plea); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 11
advisory committee's note to 1974 amendment (explaining the different presumptions that
courts employ when deciding whether to allow a nolo contendere plea); U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-27.440(B) (2017), https://www.justice.gov/
usam/usam-9-27000-principles-federal-prosecution#9-27.440 ("Despite the constitutional
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merely a narrow exception to the broader claim I make here that
courts do not strive to protect the public's interest in reviewing
defendants' decisions not to contest the charges against them.
C. COMPARING JUDICIAL REVIEW
Consider what courts must review and what they cannot review
in class actions and criminal prosecution. Before precluding
individual claims that typically would not be financially viable in
any event,1 05 courts must ensure that a $5-$45 payment is enough
compensation for those few consumers who bother to file claim
forms1 06 and who may have been misled into thinking, for instance,
that their juice had naturally occurring vitamins instead of
chemically-synthesized equivalents.107 But courts cannot stop a
prosecutor from dangling a Damoclean mandatory sentence over a
defendant's head to induce a guilty plea even when everyone in the
room-prosecutor included-thinks the resulting sentence is
validity of Alford pleas, such pleas should be avoided except in the most unusual
circumstances .... Involvement by attorneys for the government in the inducement of
guilty pleas by defendants who protest their innocence may create an appearance of
prosecutorial overreaching."); Abraham S. Goldstein, Converging Criminal Justice Systems:
Guilty Pleas and the Public Interest, 49 SMU L. REV. 567, 573 (1996) ("An equivocal plea of
guilty invites suspicion about the processes of justice. And that suspicion, inevitably, does
serious damage to the symbolic, deterrent, and correctional functions of criminal law.").
105 When individual claims have positive value because they could feasibly be brought
individually, courts are more hesitant to certify class actions than when the claims have
negative value. See Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980) ("Where it
is not economically feasible to obtain relief within the traditional framework of a
multiplicity of small individual suits for damages, aggrieved persons may be without any
effective redress unless they may employ the class-action device."); Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 161 (1974) (recognizing that petitioner could not recover anything
on his $70 claim without a class action).
1o6 See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Geoffrey P. Miller, Will Aggregate Litigation Come to
Europe?, 62 VAND. L. REV. 179, 205 (2009) ("Some documented consumer claim rates have
been in the single digits, and in one case not a single class member filed a claim, even
though the class consisted of more than a million people.").
1o7 See Pappas v. Naked Juice Co. of Glendora, Inc., No. 2:11-cv-08276-JAK-PLA, 2014 WL
12382279, at *4-9 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 2, 2014) (granting final settlement approval after
determining that the proposed settlement was fair, reasonable, and adequate); Amended
Consolidated Class Action Complaint ¶J 26-63, In re Naked Juice Cases, No. 2:11-cv-8276-
JAK-PLA (C.D. Cal. June 5, 2012), ECF No. 63 (detailing allegations about misleadingly
using synthesized vitamins in place of naturally-occurring equivalents in juices labeled "all
natural").
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inappropriate.o10  Although existing due process case law defangs
judges in this scenario,1 09 such a process is coercive and violates
prosecutors' duty to ensure procedural fairness for defendants.1 10
Class action scholarship widely recognizes that class members
are apathetic about the litigation because their claims are
typically very low value.'1 1 Accordingly, class action law turns to
judges as third-party monitors. Although it may not seem obvious,
criminal law suffers from the same rational apathy problem. The
average member of the public cares very little about each
individual case that proceeds through the criminal courts
(exempting cases in which they are particularly involved as a
victim or defendant and the rare high-profile case).112
10s See United States v. Kupa, 976 F. Supp. 2d 417, 420 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) ("To coerce guilty
pleas, and sometimes to coerce cooperation as well, prosecutors routinely threaten ultra-
harsh, enhanced mandatory sentences that no one-not even the prosecutors themselves-
thinks are appropriate." (emphasis omitted (footnote omitted)). Courts can, of course, say
that prosecutors' actions in this regard are unjust as Judge Gleeson did in Kupa, but they
are powerless to actually stop this from happening. During the Obama administration, at
least the guidance from the top sought to avoid this behavior. See Memorandum from The
Attorney Gen. on Guidance Regarding § 851 Enhancements in Plea Negotiation to Dep't of
Justice Attorneys (Sept. 24, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/oip/foia-library/ag-guidance-on
section.851 enhancementsin-pleanegotiations/download (instructing prosecutors not to
use prior felony enhancements "for the sole or predominant purpose of inducing a defendant
to plead guilty").
109 Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 750-51, 755 (1970) (holding that a plea is not
unduly coercive simply because it eliminates the possibility of the death penalty).
110 See MODELRULES OF PROF'L CONDUCTr. 3.8 cmt. 1 (AM. BARAss'N 2016) (explaining that
the prosecutor has "specific obligations to see that the defendant is accorded procedural
justice"). Much of the discretion built into prosecutors' decisionmaking relies on the notion of
trusting prosecutors to abide by their duty to do justice and simply do the right thing in the
absence of meaningful checks. See Ronald F. Wright, How Prosecutor Elections Fail Us, 6
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 581, 588 (2009) (noting that the public relies "on the chief prosecutor's
professional conscience" and not institutional constraints, to hold prosecutors accountable).
uM See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation Governance: Taking Accountability Seriously,
110 COLuM. L. REV. 288, 305 (2010) (describing the "rational apathy" of "many small
claimants"); Samuel Issacharoff, The Governance Problem in Aggregate Litigation, 81
FORDHAM L. REV. 3165, 3171 (2013) (describing the "rational apathy of the [class members]
to expend huge effort to monitor developments" in their case (internal quotations omitted));
Leslie, supra note 47, at 1047 ("[I]t is perfectly rational for each individual class member to
forego any monitoring.").
112 Erik Lillquist, Recasting Reasonable Doubt: Decision Theory and the Virtues of
Variability, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 85, 137-38 (2002); cf. Schulhofer, supra note 54, at 800
n.259 (distinguishing between visibility of the criminal justice system to individual
defendants and in cases that receive press coverage from visibility to the broader public of
rules applicable in all cases). In both contexts, a few individual victims may hold strong
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That the public-client in criminal law suffers from the same
rational apathy as is well-recognized in class members indicates
that criminal law too should be skeptical of an approach to
accountability that relies heavily on direct monitoring by the
public-client. Yet the primary formal mechanism for prosecutor
accountability-an election-does exactly that. Rather, the
comparison to class counsel suggests that judges might also be
effective third-party monitors of prosecutors' behavior. In some
instances, rather than substituting for direct voter control, judges
can improve the viability of voters' check on prosecutors.
Some scholars have rightly explained that adding less-
interested prosecutors to crucial decisions makes a lot of sense for
combating prosecutors' cognitive biases.113 And that approach is
particularly feasible in U.S. Attorneys' offices, which have three
levels of prosecutors in the hierarchy.114 But while such measures
can prevent prosecutors who have already made up their minds
that the defendant deserves to go to prison from overlooking
contrary evidence that arises later or from failing to disclose
exculpatory evidence,1 15 looking up the ranks of prosecutors' offices
cannot neutralize completely concerns about misalignment
between prosecutors' interests and their constituents'. Rather,
looking further up the organization is likely to aggravate, rather
than mitigate, career-driven self-interests by drawing in even
more ambitious people with an even greater self-interested stake
views, and there are procedures to bring these views to the fore. But there is no reason to
think that those victims' views are widely shared across broader public, and therefore these
victims cannot reliably monitor their agent on the group's behalf.
na See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 6, at 895-906; Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial
Decision Making: Some Lessons of Cognitive Science, 47 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 1587, 1621
(2006); Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in
Criminal Cases, 2006 WIs. L. REV. 291, 388. Separating functions is not costless. It
requires more time for each successive prosecutor to get up to speed about the case before
making critical decisions and, to the extent that there is an identifiable victim, that victim
may no longer have a single point of contact in the prosecutor's office depending on how
responsibilities are divided. But these costs seem well worth their while.
114 Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, 'The U.S. Attorneys Scandal" and the Allocation
of Prosecutorial Power, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 187, 196-97, 203 (2008) (explaining that each
federal district has three levels of prosecutors, including the head U.S. attorney,
supervisory assistants, and line prosecutors that handle day-to-day matters).
115 See id. at 201.
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in the public perception of decisions their office makes.116 Such an
approach may actually strengthen pressure to maintain a high
conviction rate and perhaps maximize the number of convictions
given a budgetary constraint. Civil forfeiture can aggravate these
concerns.117 Forfeitures can aggrandize the office's budget and
thus will likely be quite desirable for lead prosecutors in charge of
those budgets.118
Ultimately, because internal processes do not check all relevant
agency costs and prosecutor elections do not work well,
"prosecutors are among the least accountable public officials."119
Accountability comes down to trusting prosecutors' commitment to
public service and professional conscience in a regime where there
are not well-established standards to guide them.120 Many people,
myself included, think that this trust is not totally misplaced.121
116 See id. at 202-03 ('The chief prosecutor may be influenced by an illegitimate self-interest
in reelection or political advancement in situations where lower-level prosecutors would be
less affected by those interests."); Jed Shugerman, The Rise of the Prosecutor-Politicians 3
(Apr. 2015) (unpublished manuscript), https://www.berekeley.edulwp-content/uploads/2015/0
4/Shugerman-Earl-Warren-chapter-Rise-of-the-Prosecutor-Politicians-1.22.pdf ("[T]he office of
prosecutor can be a stepping stone to higher political office .....").
117 See Eric Blumenson & Eva Nilsen, Policing for Profit: The Drug War's Hidden
Economic Agenda, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 35, 56 (1998).
118 Id.
119 Green & Zacharias, supra note 3, at 902.
120 See Barkow, supra note 6, at 871 (arguing that the lack of a legal check on federal
prosecutors' discretion to bring charges, negotiate pleas, and set office policies is a
"dangerous exception" to the national commitment to separation of powers); Angela J.
Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67 FORDHAM L. REV.
13, 18 (1998) (arguing that prosecutorial discretion "gives prosecutors more power than any
other criminal justice officials, with practically no corresponding accountability to the public
they serve" (footnotes omitted)); Wright, supra note 110, at 588 ("To some extent, we rely on
the chief prosecutor's professional conscience: the prosecutor must remain individually
committed to the ideal of responsible prosecution. Our most beloved descriptions of the job
speak to the importance of a prosecutor doing the job well without any prompting from the
outside."). Regarding the lack of guidance, see Green & Zacharias, supra note 3, at 903.
121 See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Rewarding Prosecutors for Performance, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM.
L. 441, 443 (2009) ('Many public-spirited prosecutors want to do justice and serve as officers
of the court and also would like to gain trial experience and to feel the thrill of the chase.");
Samuel W. Buell, The Upside of Overbreadth, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1491, 1516 (2008)
(discussing prosecutors' career ambitions and noting that "their motivations should be
expected to include ones that are social regarding even if their actions sometimes, or even
frequently, prove misguided"); Ronald F. Wright & Marc L. Miller, The Worldwide
Accountability Deficit for Prosecutors, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1587, 1589 (2010) ("Most
prosecutors, in our experience, are conscientious public servants.").
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But it is an awful lot of trust to place in self-interested actors with
even the best of intentions.122
In criminal law, internal administrative processes and
attention to organizational structure improve accountability
beyond relying on largely-ineffectual elections,123 but prosecutor
accountability remains far from perfect.124 To help close the
accountability deficit in criminal law, thinking about class action
law's use of judges to monitor class counsel's behavior and protect
the client's interests (imperfect though it is) suggests that judges
can play a more meaningful substantive role supervising
prosecutors' charging decisions and the plea process.12 5 The idea of
greater judicial involvement is to protect the public-client and
ensure that prosecutors abide by their obligation to treat
defendants fairly. 126
How exactly the notion of judicial class settlement fairness
review translates into the criminal context, where separation of
powers concerns come to the fore, is not straightforward, but the
rest of the Article explores that in more detail.
122 See Ronald F. Wright, Beyond Prosecutor Elections, 67 SMU L. REV. 593, 598 (2014)
("But in a constitutional design meant to create a 'government of laws' that does not count
on the angelic qualities of the people who hold power, the professional integrity of
prosecutors as individuals is not enough.").
123 See Kay L. Levine & Ronald F. Wright, Prosecution in 3-D, 102 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1119, 1123, 1137, 1147, 1152 (2012) (finding that some offices assign different
prosecutors to handle each procedural phase of a case and that offices vary substantially as
to how much consultation prosecutors do with colleagues, while prosecutors in other offices
view themselves as independent contractors assigned to their roster of cases); see also
Barkow, supra note 6, at 895-906 (advocating greater attention to supervision in federal
prosecutors' offices and separating adjudication and enforcement as tasks to be done by
different actors to check prosecutor overreach); Kitai-Sangero, supra note 59, at 85
(proposing separating functions within prosecutor offices to require a different prosecutor to
try cases than the prosecutor who had the open dialogue with the defendant).
124 See, e.g., Green & Zacharias, supra note 3, at 847 ("[Ilndividual prosecutors' preferences
still control a vast range and number of choices, free of outside or supervisory controls.").
125 In an article explaining the benefits of comparativism between civil and criminal
procedure, David Sklansky and Stephen Yeazell briefly lay out a comparison between civil
settlements and plea agreements and suggest that the comparison cuts in favor of more
judicial involvement in plea negotiation. Sklansky & Yeazell, supra note 9, at 696-705.
126 See Gold, Beyond the Judicial Fourth Amendment, supra note 7, at 1642 (explaining
that the public-client typically benefits from affording defendants fair treatment); Green,
supra note 28, at 642 (explaining that prosecutors' "minister of justice" duty requires
seeking to avoid punishment of innocent people and ensuring fair procedure for defendants).
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IV. IMPLICATIONS
The dramatically different approaches that class actions and
criminal law take to similar questions about accountability are not
justifiable.127 This Part explores the lessons that criminal law can
learn from class action law in addressing the accountability deficit
that arises in both contexts from the lack of client control. In
short, the answer is to allow judges to check prosecutors, much as
they do in class actions.
As with class action judges at settlement, judges in criminal
cases should review plea agreements to ensure that the
substantive terms are fair to the prosecutor's public-client and
that prosecutors have adhered to their constitutional
obligations.1 28  When mandatory minimums or sentencing
enhancements prevent judges from imposing the sentences they
think are right, those judges should articulate their views on the
record in open court and ask the prosecutor to justify her
decisions.
If ex post fairness review does not prove sufficiently robust in
criminal cases, judges could be involved during the negotiation
process129 or even before it begins.130  And indeed, earlier
involvement by judges can help improve their ability to
meaningfully conduct fairness review ex post, and thus judicial
intervention at multiple points makes good sense.131
A. SUBSTANTIVE FAIRNESS REVIEW
As in class actions, judges should seek to hold the "clientless"
lawyer accountable by substantively reviewing the fairness of the
sentences proposed in plea agreements.132 In some contexts, this
127 I explain this in more detail elsewhere. Gold, "Clientless" Lawyers, supra note 1.
128 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2) (requiring judicial review of class settlements for
substantive fairness).
129 See infra Section IV.B.1.
130 See infra Section IV.B.2.
131 See infra Section IV.B.2.
132 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2) (requiring judicial review of class settlements for
substantive fairness). Adam Zimmerman and David Jaros draw on a comparison between
class actions and criminal law to propose substantive judicial review of aspects of plea
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notion means only that judges should impose sentences that they
think best serve the public's interest, which does not seem terribly
controversial.1 33 This Article also seeks to consider how judges in
criminal cases should tackle the amorphous and difficult task of
reviewing the fairness of plea agreements by drawing on the ways
that class action judges approach their similar task of fairness
review. First, as in class actions, judges in criminal cases should
inquire into the process that facilitated the plea agreement for
indicia of fairness or cause for concern. Second, judges should
afford opportunities for greater input about the fairness of a
proposed plea agreement, which parallels class members' rights to
object to a class settlement. Moreover, although this suggestion
does not track anything that judges in class actions do explicitly,134
judges should also consider whether the recommended sentence
tracks the rough "market rate," as two prominent scholars have
already recommended.135 If all of these steps occurred or were
explained in open court and on a written record, these measures
would better facilitate prosecutor accountability both within their
offices and to voters by increasing the availability of information
that is deeply deficient now.136
A brief overview of the form that this review should take seems
useful here.137  In cases where the parties present a plea
agreement for approval and the sentencing term contained is only
agreements related to victim compensation-portions of plea agreements that already look
a lot like class settlements. Zimmerman & Jaros, supra note 40, at 1428, 1447.
1as See United States v. Orthofix, Inc., 956 F. Supp. 2d 316, 327 (D. Mass. 2013) ("[W]hen a
court is asked to place its imprimatur on the parties' invocation of the coercive power of the
state, it must consider whether the recommended sentence will best serve the public interest.
It would be wrong to infer from the parties' confidence that their narrow interests are served
by the bargain that the bargain thereby addresses the broad range of concerns which are held
by the public."); see also Bierschbach & Bibas, supra note 88, at 3-4 (explaining that even if
plea deals strike a balance between the private interests of two adversaries, the process gives
no reason to think that the public's interests in justice will be protected).
134 Judges reviewing class settlement fairness may conduct market rate analysis
implicitly. See infra note 159.
135 See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 22, at 1922-23, 1959.
136 See Gold, supra note 57, at 78-79 (describing the political check as ineffective because
of voters' lack of information); Wright, supra note 110, at 582 ("There are reasons to believe
that elections could lead prosecutors to apply the criminal law according to public priorities
and values. . . .Yet the reality of prosecutor elections is not so encouraging.").
137 See supra Section III.A for more detail.
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a recommendation, the judge should use fairness review to help
determine whether to impose the recommended sentence or
whether to be more harsh or more lenient. In the context of a
take-it-or-leave-it plea agreement, where the judge can only accept
the proposed sentence or reject the plea agreement entirely, she
should reject it with an explanation of why the proposed sentence
was not fair to the prosecutor's public-client. Lastly, when a judge
cannot impose a fair sentence because a mandatory minimum has
forced the sentence above or a charge bargain has forced the
sentence below what she thinks is fair, the judge should play an
information-generating and information-forcing role. She should
explain her concerns with the resulting sentence on the record in
open court and ask the prosecutor to justify the charging decision
that is requiring that sentence. This additional information will
improve accountability both within prosecutors' offices and with
the electorate.
1. Evaluating Plea Negotiation Process. Courts face a tall order
in trying to assess whether a class settlement amount is large
enough to render it fair to the absent class members,138 especially
discounting for factors like the likelihood of success at trial.139 To
combat these challenges, one approach that class action judges take
is evaluating the negotiation process that led to the settlement for
indicia of fairness.140 Indeed, the advisory committee is in the
13 See Howard M. Erichson, The Problem of Settlement Class Actions, 82 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 951, 984 (2014) ("Evaluating the fairness of class settlements presents a challenge for
judges .... ); Samuel Issacharoff, Class Action Conflicts, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 805, 811
(1997) (explaining that "we have no baseline by which to judge whether or not the plaintiffs
are getting a good deal" in settlement class actions); Macey & Miller, supra note 64, at 179
("Courts have limited capacity to value what the class is receiving in the settlement.").
139 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e) (specifying the necessary procedures for court approval of a
class action settlement); PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 67, at 214 (proposing rule
change specifying that adequacy of relief for the class should consider, as it already does
based on case law, the "risks" of "trial and appeal"); see also, e.g., City of Detroit v. Grinnell,
495 F.2d 448, 463 (2d Cir. 1974) (considering "the risks of establishing liability, the risks of
establishing damages," and "the risks of maintaining the class action through the trial. . .").
140 See PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 67, at 225 (explaining the usefulness of
procedural factors such as negotiation at arm's length); 7B WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra
note 20, § 1797.1 ("A presumption of fairness, adequacy, and reasonableness may attach to
a class settlement reached in arm's-length negotiations between experienced, capable
counsel after meaningful discovery."); see also, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A.,
Inc., 396 F.3d 96, 116 (2d Cir. 2005) ("A court determines a settlement's fairness by looking
at both the settlement's terms and the negotiating process leading to settlement.").
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process of amending Rule 23 to clarify the usefulness of considering
the negotiation process when judges analyze class settlement
fairness.141 In so doing, it has explained that "looking to the conduct
of the litigation and of the negotiations leading up to the proposed
settlement .. . is an important foundation for scrutinizing the
specifics of the proposed settlement."1 42  In evaluating the
negotiation process, courts should consider "the nature and amount
of discovery in this or other [related] cases" because this "may
indicate whether counsel negotiating on behalf of the class had an
adequate information base."1 4 3 So too will the amended Rule 23
direct courts to consider whether "a neutral or court-affiliated
mediator or facilitator" was involved.144
As in class actions, evaluating the process of plea bargaining in
a particular case can add real value.145 The court can glean
something useful about the fairness of the deal by looking at how
much information the defendant obtained to evaluate the charges
against her or whether the case settled very early.146 So too is it
valuable for the court to consider whether the plea was negotiated
with the help of a mediator or other neutral that will make it seem
less like the product of heavy prosecutorial leverage being brought
to bear against an incarcerated defendant with no good choices.147
As indicia of overreach, the judge should ask about and consider
any "hard bargaining" tactics employed that might prompt
141 See PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 67, at 213-14 (listing proposed factors to assess
settlement fairness); see also PRINCIPLES OF LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 3.05 cmt. a (AM.
LAW INST. 2010) (describing case law on evaluating settlement fairness as "in disarray").
142 PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 67, at 225.
143 Id. at 225-26. Although the current case law is messy, most circuits explicitly list the
extent of discovery as an important factor, while others list factors encompassing that
consideration such as the stage of the proceedings. RULE 23 SUBCOMMITTEE, APRIL 2015
REPORT 36-41.
144 PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 67, at 226.
145 See id. at 225 (explaining that procedural provide "an important foundation" for
scrutinizing the fairness of a settlement).
146 See Macey & Miller, supra note 64, at 192 (describing very early "shotgun" settlements
as a "yellow flag" for judicial review of class action settlement fairness). Lack of meaningful
information exchange would likely sweep in the vast majority of cases at present, but
including this factor in the review process will usefully change lawyers' incentives going
forward. See infra notes 166-68 and accompanying text.
147 It is not clear to what extent mediators or other neutrals are involved in plea
negotiations now, see King & Wright, supra note 16, at 351-55, but including this factor in
the plea fairness analysis could help bring a neutral perspective into these discussions.
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questions about the harshness of the proposed sentence, including:
threatened additional charges, mandatory minimums, sentencing
enhancements, or exploding plea offers.148 Current Supreme Court
doctrine provides that these heavy-handed tactics do not render a
plea involuntary,149 but they could nonetheless trigger close review
of the deal. Such tactics suggest that the proposed outcome was
the result of leverage and not the result of negotiation by informed
adversaries.
So too might procedural queries about the volume of information
exchanged and the duration and form of the negotiations help
judges detect "sweetheart" plea deals where prosecutors have
underreached. Underreach might be a particular concern in cases
involving deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) in which the
government secures a hefty and headline-grabbing settlement
amount in exchange for not bringing criminal charges, as the public
might have preferred.150  Securities cases may also generate
underreach concerns, simply because scienter-an element that
must be proven in those cases-is harder to prove than, for
instance, proving possession after a buy-and-bust. Public sentiment
regarding culpability for the financial crisis and the number of
individuals prosecuted seem disconnected, which might evince
underreach.15 1 Underreach concerns might also arise with police
officer defendants, such as in Ferguson, where no charges were
148 See Alkon, supra note 95, at 406-13 (categorizing and detailing forms of "hard
bargaining"). The particularities of this inquiry into threats are not analogous to class
actions but are necessary because of the power disparity that existing law creates between
prosecutors and criminal defendants. See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text.
149 See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978) (holding that a prosecutor
threatening a charge carrying a mandatory life sentence to induce a plea does not violate
due process); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970) (holding that a prosecutor
threatening the death penalty to induce a plea does not violate due process). For purposes
of this discussion I take these holdings as given.
1-s See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
151 See, e.g., Frontline: The Untouchables (PBS Jan. 22 2013), http://www.pbs.org/wgbhI
frontline/film/untouchables (investigating why Wall Street leaders avoided prosecution for
their role in the financial crisis). Whether the lack of prosecution simply reflects prosecutors'
ethical obligations and a lack of evidence is a much more difficult question that I do not
address here. See, e.g., Jed S. Rakoff, The Financial Crisis: Why Have No High-Level
Executives Been Prosecuted?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Jan. 9, 2014, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/
2014/01/09/financial-crisis-why-no-executive-prosecutions/ (arguing that a government report
repeatedly found instances of fraud underlying the financial crisis, which thus made the lack
of prosecutions all the more concerning).
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filed,152 or with the lack of prosecutions of employers for serious
workplace injuries and deaths.153 In these sorts of cases, judges
should be particularly vigilant at examining underreach. To be
sure, judges' ability to check prosecutor underreach is inherently
limited. If a prosecutor decides not to bring a case, that decision is
insulated from judicial review for separation of powers reasons.154
Perhaps the class action and criminal law contexts are so
fundamentally different that analyzing process makes great sense
in class actions and no sense in criminal law.155 But that seems
unlikely. Scott and Stuntz make a good point that a two-minute
conversation between a prosecutor and public defender in the
hallway, for which defense counsel is poorly prepared, might
suggest that defense counsel is savvy and knows that the
investigation will likely turn up little and has a strong sense about
other cases and going rates, rather than a sloppy, lazy, or
overstretched lawyer.156 But that point assumes that case-specific
facts do not affect market price or that one can know without
152 See Levine, supra note 51, at 755-56 (noting the unraveling of the normal charge and
indictment process with police defendants). See generally Kate Levine, Who Shouldn't
Prosecute the Police, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1447 (2016) (arguing that a structural conflict of
interest arises when prosecutors are expected to bring cases against local police).
153 See MARTHA T. MCCLUSKEY ET AL., CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, PREVENTING DEATH
AND INJURY ON THE JOB: THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE ALTERNATIVE IN STATE LAW 1 (Mar. 2016),
http://www.progressivereform.orglarticles/WorkerProsecutionManual_1602.pdf (citing a
statistic showing that 4,679 workers suffered fatal occupational injuries in 2014 alone and
noting that "criminal charges for the violation are rare').
154 See Inmates of Attica Corr. Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375, 381 (2d Cir. 1973)
(holding that federal courts could not compel prosecutions, even in the context of a federal
civil rights statute, which provides that United States Attorneys are "authorized and
required ... to institute prosecutions against all persons violating" any of the relevant
statutes (emphasis omitted) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1987 (2012)). Non-prosecution agreements
(NPAs) raise the same concern as DPAs, but it is hard to see a role for judicial review of
NPAs. See United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., No. 12-CR-763, 2013 WL 3306161, at
*5-7 (E.D.N.Y. July 1, 2013) (finding that the court has authority to review the substance of
DPAs but not NPAs). Unlike in DPAs where charges are filed and held in abeyance, no
charges are ever filed in an NPA. Cindy R. Alexander & Mark A. Cohen, The Evolution of
Corporate Criminal Settlements: An Empirical Perspective on Non-Prosecution, Deferred
Prosecution, and Plea Agreements, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 537, 545 (2015).
156 See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 22, at 1959 (contending that the bargaining process
does not provide any information useful to determine whether counsel secured a good deal
through plea bargaining because knowing about other cases and going rates has greater
import than case-specific preparation).
156 See id.
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investigation that there will be no case-specific facts that bear on
the applicable going rate.15 7 Both assumptions seem mistaken in
at least some instances.
Considering process as a proxy for substantive fairness is not
perfect in class actions, and it will not work perfectly in criminal
law.15 8 But the basic idea seems right in class actions: lawyers
who have taken discovery and secured helpful evidence (or have
been unable to secure helpful evidence) have likely struck a deal
that better reflects the merits of the case than lawyers who simply
settled on a $20 million settlement as the going-rate for a
particular type of class action.159 Likewise, although going rates
are quite relevant, a prosecutor who knows the going rates and
knows her own cases well enough to assess the applicability of
those rates with sufficient nuance will tend to better serve the
public-client than the one who knows only the former.160 More
controversially, it seems plausible (though certainly not provable
here) that criminal defense attorneys who engage in protracted
negotiations involving numerous counter-offers secure better
157 Cf. Bibas, Designing Plea Bargaining, supra note 21, at 1065 (arguing that because
actors in the criminal justice system focus on technical questions such as the permissible
reach of a statute they miss equitable factors and sentence guilty defendants often to "far
more punishment than they really deserve"); id. at 1066 (explaining that the criminal
justice system has taken a "mechanical, assembly-line approach to processing cases" in
which "we have squeezed out individualized weighing of desert, remorse, reform, and
similar particularistic moral values"); Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and
the Equitable Decision Not to Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1688-92 (2010)
(explaining that prosecutors, in part because of their legal training, tend to view cases in
categories and may miss the equitable particulars).
15s See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Lecture, The Settlement Black Box, 75 B.U. L. REV. 1257,
1264 (1995) (discussing limits to courts' capacity to rationally assess the negotiation
processes that lead to class settlements).
159 See, e.g., Objector-Appellant Ginger McCall's Petition for Rehearing En Banc, at 15-17,
Lane v. Facebook, Inc., No. 10-16380 (9th Cir. Oct. 4, 2012), ECF No. 62 (urging en banc
review so that district courts could have sufficient guidance on how to review settlements with
cy pres awards rather than simply having to compare proposed settlements to going rates);
Kashmir Hill, Facebook Judge Doesn't Realize $10 Million Is The Going Rate To Settle Privacy
Lawsuits, FORBES (Aug. 6, 2012, 11:27 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2012/0
8/06/facebook-judge-doesnt-realize-10-million-is-the-going-rate-to-settle-privacy-lawsuits/#9ae
7fb6430e2 (collecting information about settlements of other digital privacy class actions in the
Ninth Circuit for similar amounts as the initially-proposed settlement in a privacy class action
against Facebook).
160 Cf. Traum, supra note 93, at 869 (expressing concern that judges might treat unlike
cases alike by focusing only on market rates).
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results than those who just accept a prosecutor's plea offer as
given.161 And it seems quite plausible too that when criminal
defense counsel investigates a claim or receives discovery, the
outcome of the negotiation will better track a case's merit.162
To facilitate judicial review ex post, regulating the plea
bargaining process could also add great value.163 Plea bargaining
regulation modeled on consumer law, such as requiring clear
disclosures, reasonable standard terms that can be deviated from
with detailed explanation by the prosecutor, and interpretive
conventions such as construing against the drafter (the prosecutor,
by assumption) would help.164 All plea agreements,165 offers or
threats made in plea negotiation, and any deadlines placed on
those offers should be written.
When the lawyers know that certain process factors will make
it easier or harder to get their deal ratified ex post, they may
change their behavior during negotiations to account for that
scrutiny in ways that improve the fairness of the settlement
process. For instance, most criminal cases do not now involve a
wide exchange of information.166 But establishing the volume of
information exchanged as a factor in plea agreement fairness
review may encourage prosecutors to disclose more information to
defendants than they do now or before they are constitutionally
compelled to do so. Some prosecutors could adopt open file policies
even in the many jurisdictions where open file is not required.
Disclosure of more evidence in more cases adds cost of course, but
the benefit of affording defendants more informed choice before
161 See Jenny Roberts & Ronald F. Wright, Training for Bargaining, 57 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1445, 1485-87 (2016) (finding that defense attorneys "usually" but did not "always"
counter a prosecutor's offer and that defendants "sometimes" accept prosecutors' first offer).
162 Cf. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691 (1984) (finding that the objective
standard of reasonableness for effective assistance of counsel requires "mak[ing] reasonable
investigations or... mak[ing] a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations
unnecessary").
163 Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market, supra note 93, at 1153-59 (proposing
these regulatory approaches).
164 Id. at 1153-56.
165 See id. at 1154 (arguing that all plea agreements should be in writing).
166 See, e.g., Bibas, Designing Plea Bargaining, supra note 21, at 1064.
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waiving their rights outweighs the added cost, in my view.167 A
greater exchange of information helps facilitate settlement by
tending to cause the parties' views of the merits to converge rather
than through one side wielding disproportionate leverage, which is
a good thing for prosecutors seeking to ensure procedural fairness
for defendants.168
Privileging pleas in which a neutral mediator was involved also
makes sense. In such cases, a neutral actor would be present to
anchor or steer the discussions and potentially blunt the effects of
the prosecutors' powerful charging tools that can essentially coerce
a guilty plea.169 Accordingly, to the extent that adding this
consideration of input from a neutral into fairness review
encourages prosecutors to involve neutrals in future cases, that too
is good.170 In short, the comparison to fairness review in class
action settlements suggests in part that judges in criminal cases
can benefit from considering the plea bargaining process as
evidence of the substantive fairness of the deal.
Although the notion of judges reviewing plea agreements for
fairness to protect the prosecutor's public-client may seem strange,
the idea is to insert an actor into the process to look after interests
167 Accord id. at 1079 ("The most obvious remedy is to liberalize both the amount and
timing of discovery, as discussed above. Discovery must be ample and occur well in advance
of a plea hearing." (footnotes omitted)).
168 Gold et al., supra note 9; see also Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, An Economic
Model of Legal Discovery, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 435, 439 (1994) ("The first purpose of discovery
is to increase the probability of settlement."); David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of
the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619, 2647-48 (1995) ("[When] the parties learn the crucial
facts of the case before trial, they can assess its prospects, worth, and how best to dispose of
it."); Maurice Rosenberg, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Action: Assessing Their Impact,
137 U. PA. L. REV. 2197, 2198 (1989) ("Open discovery would promote settlements; with
both sides obliged to turn over all their important cards, secrets would disappear and
realistic negotiations would occur.").
169 Prosecutors' huge menu of charging options that result in different possible sentences
(sometimes mandatorily) with different potential collateral consequences, and their ability
to threaten to charge a more serious offense or charge a defendant's relative if the
defendant pleads guilty are well-documented sources of prosecutor leverage. See, e.g., Marc
L. Miller, Domination & Dissatisfaction: Prosecutors as Sentencers, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1211,
1252-59 (2004) (discussing the immense authority that federal prosecutors have under the
sentencing guidelines); Stuntz, supra note 30, at 2549 (describing criminal law and
sentencing law and providing "a menu from which the prosecutor may order as she
wishes"); Gold et al., supra note 9 (discussing this leverage).
170 See infra Section IV.B.1.
730 [Vol. 51:693
2017] "CLIENTLESS" PROSECUTORS 731
that are not sufficiently protected by the private bargaining
process.171 Questions may arise as to why judges would be any
better than prosecutors at protecting the public interest. The
short answer is first that my proposal encourages judges-in
addition to rather than instead of prosecutors-to protect the
public interest. And second, that judges do not share the cognitive
biases that may lead to overreach because they are not being
asked to view the case through both an adversarial and neutral,
quasi-judicial lens as prosecutors are.172 And judges quickly build
expertise on criminal sentencing. As to some aspects of criminal
justice enforcement, executive branch officials are better equipped
than judges; questions about resource allocation or a case's
relationship to an overall enforcement scheme fit this bill. 173 But
the Supreme Court's notion that judges are ill-equipped to assess
the strength of a case-at least if called upon to do so and given
opportunities to gather sufficient facts-is passing strange.174
Ultimately, the takeaway from these cases about judicial expertise
is that judges should focus their review on questions about just
deserts and the purposes of sentencing in their individual cases
rather than on questions regarding resource allocation.175
171 But see United States v. Orthofix, Inc., 956 F. Supp. 2d 316, 327 (D. Mass. 2013) ("It
would be wrong to infer from the parties' confidence that their narrow interests are served
by the bargain that the bargain thereby addresses the broad range of concerns which are
held by the public."); Bierschbach & Bibas, supra note 88, at 3-4 (explaining that even if
plea deals strike a balance between the private interests of two adversaries, the process
gives no reason to think the public's interests in justice will be protected).
172 See Barkow, supra note 6, at 908 ("In theory, greater judicial involvement would be the
ideal corrective measure because it would interject a truly independent actor-an Article III
judge-to curb the abuses outlined above. Judges are certainly less biased than
a ... prosecutor."); Alafair S. Burke, Prosecutorial Passion, Cognitive Bias, and Plea
Bargaining, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 183, 207-08 (2007) (explaining that "judges stand in a better
position to make a more objective, accurate assessment of the likelihood of conviction" than
prosecutors because of their lack of adversarial position).
173 See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) ("This broad discretion rests
largely on the recognition that the decision to prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial
revisions.").
174 See id. ("Such factors as the strength of the case ... are not readily susceptible to the
kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake."); see also, e.g., 4 LAFAVE ET AL.,
supra note 11, § 12.1(b) (listing the "strength of the case" as a factor that judges consider
when determining whether to grant bail).
175 Cf. United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., No. 12-CR- 763, 2013 WL 3306161, at *4,
*8 (E.D.N.Y. July 1, 2013) (explaining that although the court had the power to review the
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That many judges in criminal cases are elected poses some
challenges. Most criminal cases are resolved in state courts, and
most states elect their judges.176 As with prosecutors, elected
judges have some incentive to appear tough on crime to please
voters and keep their jobs. But elected judges should feel less pull
to appear tough on crime than should prosecutors, except in high-
profile cases, because the public is much more likely to blame
prosecutors for crime than judges.177 And appellate review checks
trial court judges in ways that, absent a strong judicial check,
prosecutors are not constrained.17  That elected judges may seek
to curry favor with the electorate by sentencing more harshly than
the prosecutor wishes remains somewhat troubling, but given the
feasible options, placing sentencing power in judicial rather than
prosecutorial hands makes sense.179
2. Rights to be Heard. As another tool for judges to review
class settlements, Rule 23 explicitly provides opportunities for
class members to voice their objections to the fairness of a
fairness of a deferred prosecution agreement, its review should be deferential to recognize
prosecutors' institutional expertise).
176 By contrast, at least since 2005, most class actions are heard in federal court. See
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 4, 119 Stat. 4, 9 (2005) (expanding
federal class action jurisdiction).
177 See Stuntz, supra note 62, at 540.
178 That many state judges were once prosecutors may also skew judges' decisions in favor
of the government. See Cynthia K.Y. Lee, From Gatekeeper to Concierge: Reigning in the
Federal Prosecutor's Expanding Power over Substantial Assistance Departures, 50 RUTGERS
L. REV. 199, 200 (1997) (recognizing that many judges were previously prosecutors). But
that result is not obvious. Some former-prosecutor-judges seem to be harsher on
prosecutors having once walked in their shoes. For instance, Judge Gleeson has been a
prominent advocate of reforming unduly harsh criminal sentences and an opponent of
prosecutors' non-judicious use of sentencing enhancements. See United States v. Vasquez,
No. 09-CR-259 (JG), 2010 WL 1257359, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2010) ("The mandatory
minimum sentence in this case supplanted any effort to do justice .... ). Judge Rakoff has
advocated judicial involvement in plea negotiations because innocent defendants feel undue
pressure to plead guilty. Rakoff, supra note 7. That both were federal prosecutors probably
strengthens their sense that these practices are wrong. These two examples are New York-
centric, but clerking on a court outside New York also influences my sense that former-
prosecutor-judges may sometimes be the harshest critics of prosecutorial overreach. That
is, of course, merely anecdotal, and I am not aware of any empirical work trying to evaluate
that instinct.
179 Perhaps it is worth repeating here that judges checking prosecutors' faithfulness to
their public-clients is a third-best solution to accountability concerns. But the two better




settlement proposal.180 The basic idea is to combat the information
deficit that courts face when lawyers for both sides are friends of
the deal.18 1 To facilitate class members' input, class members
receive notice of the terms of a proposed settlement.182
Similarly, in criminal cases, once the lawyers for both sides
have struck a deal, they will have every incentive to get the court
to approve it. They are unlikely then to present the sorts of
considerations that might lead a court to think that the sentence
the lawyers have agreed upon is unfair to the prosecutor's public-
client-whether too high or too low. 1 83 Thus, analogously to class
actions, courts should look for other potential sources of
information by affording opportunities to be heard about the
fairness of the deal.184 Even without a formal mechanism for such
input now, judges in criminal cases occasionally receive input from
members of the prosecutor's public-client.185 Thus, there is reason
to think that, at least in some cases, if courts were to afford a
broader opportunity for members of the public to be heard
regarding plea agreement fairness during the plea hearing, judges
could receive additional useful information. Unlike in class
180 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(5).
181 See, e.g., Issacharoff, supra note 138, at 808 ("Perhaps in no other context do we find
courts entering binding decrees with such a complete lack of access to quality information
and so completely dependent on the parties who have the most to gain from favorable court
action."); see also Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market, supra note 93, at 1142
("[J]udges must depend on the parties' selective presentation of the facts[,] ... [which]
encourages judges to rubber-stamp the parties' recommendations." (footnote omitted)).
182 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(1); see also Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 173-77
(1974) (discussing Rule 23's notice requirement and noting that this "is not a discretionary
consideration to be waived in a particular case" but instead is "an unambiguous
requirement of Rule 23"). Notice and the opportunity to be heard or request exclusion take
on constitutional dimension in the class action context because class members who do not
opt-out of the case will have their claims adjudicated and thereby barred from future
litigation. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811-14 (1985).
183 See Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market, supra note 93, at 1142 (explaining
that judges are "passive and reactive" in the plea bargain context and "can neither
investigate nor advise about the tactics and merits of pleas," which forces them to rely upon
the parties' selective disclosure of facts).
184 I do not mean to suggest that these objectors would better represent the public's
interest than do prosecutors. The idea instead is simply to elicit more information and an
additional perspective for the judge to evaluate.
186 See, e.g., HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 2013 WL 3306161, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. July 1, 2013)
(explaining that the court was "aware of the heavy public criticism" of the DPA at issue due
to "unsolicited input from members of the public urging" rejection of the DPA).
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actions, a criminal case does not subsume or preclude anyone's
individual claims, so this right to be heard in the criminal context
does not take on constitutional dimension. Rather, voice rights for
members of the public are meant solely to serve the practical
purpose of adding information for the judge to consider. Thus,
courts can put reasonable parameters on these opportunities to be
heard as they see fit rather than being required to hear every
potentially-redundant comment by every interested member of the
public, which would become quite burdensome in high-profile
cases.186
In cases with particularized victims, there is reason to expect
victims to appear. But victims already have the right to be
heard.187 The idea here is to expand voice opportunities.188
Yet, except in high-profile cases where the public is already
paying attention, there is no particularly great reason to think
that most members of the public have any idea what cases are set
on a particular day in a particular courthouse; thus, there is no
reason to expect them to show up and offer meaningful input. The
same rational apathy that creates the lack of prosecutor
accountability'89 will tend to mean that opportunities for members
of the public to be heard will not be robustly utilized. But one
could imagine interest groups facilitating public campaigns to
bring community sentiment to bear on particular issues. Or courts
could appoint an amicus curiae to oppose a deal in some instances
such as where the process gives no basis for assurance of
fairness.1o In cases where there is no identifiable victim who
's Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(2) (2012) (providing that the court may fashion a reasonable
procedure in providing rights to crime victims when according all victims complete
statutory rights would be impracticable); FED. R. CRIM. P. 60(b)(3) (same).
187 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(4) (2012); see also LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 11, § 21.3(f)
(examining that all fifty states have a statutory crime victims' bill of rights, some states
also have constitutional provisions on point, and that victims' rights typically include
allowing the victims to be heard about a plea bargain before the court).
18s While affording voice rights to others, courts should take care not to undermine the
import of victims' rights provisions in the process by drowning out their voices.
189 See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
190 See William R. Rubenstein, The Fairness Hearing: Adversarial and Regulatory
Approaches, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1435, 1453-56 (2006) (discussing benefits of devil's advocates
in adding perspective to courts' class settlement fairness evaluations).
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wishes to be heard opposing the deal,191 a court could appoint two
amici-one arguing that the deal is too defendant-friendly and the
other that it is too government-friendly. Another possibility to
generate additional informational input would be for courts to
afford an incentive for entrepreneurial awyers to oppose the deal
by granting fees to a lawyer who brings useful new information to
the court's attention as class action law does for objectors.192
3. Evaluating Market Rates. Lastly, judges evaluating
proposed sentences in plea agreements should look for deviations
from market rates, as two scholars have suggested.193 Scott and
Stuntz propose that judges treat sentences from plea agreements
as a ceiling;194 they then encourage judges to sentence below that
ceiling when the recommended sentence deviates substantially
from the market rate in the jurisdiction.19 5 Scott and Stuntz are
right that judges are "in a very good position to recognize
unusually high sentences."196 Indeed, there is good reason to think
that judges are using market rate considerations already because
lawyers tend to warn judges in advance if they plan to recommend
191 See 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(4) (2012) (providing victims the right to be heard at plea,
sentencing, and parole hearings).
192 The practicalities here in criminal prosecution get tricky though because there is not a
settlement fund from which to garner the money. These fees could come from prosecutors'
offices and perhaps, more specifically, from forfeiture funds. Such an approach would chill
plea bargaining, but whether that result is desirable is a much deeper question than can be
addressed here.
193 See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 22, at 1959-60. In some class actions, courts seem to
navigate the challenges of fairness review by considering whether the settlement adheres to
some rough market rate. See Hill, supra note 159 (discussing "going rate" for settling class
actions against technology companies in the Ninth Circuit). But the practical obstacles to
obtaining meaningful information about similar settlements make that endeavor more
challenging. Indeed, it is surprisingly difficult to find out how much money class members
received in previous cases, either individually or in the aggregate, because that information
is often spread across numerous documents that can be found only by wading through
individual dockets.
194 Scott & Stuntz, supra note 22, at 1959-60.
195 Id. at 1960; see also Traum, supra note 93, at 828 (proposing that judges monitor plea
outcomes to protect defendants' constitutional rights).
196 Scott & Stuntz, supra note 22, at 1959; see also Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining
Market, supra note 93, at 1141 ("[G]oing rates and informal expectations develop among the
repeat players in the market.").
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a sentence that deviates from certain norms.197  Sentencing
guidelines play in establishing such norms.198
4. Handling Unfair Proposed Sentences. What a judge should
do when she concludes that a proposed sentence in a plea
agreement is unfair depends on the nature of the plea. In some
cases, the parties simply suggest a sentence, and the court has the
authority to impose a different sentence.199 In such cases, courts
should impose whatever sentence they deem fair even if it departs
from the lawyers' recommendation.2 0 0 Explaining the reasons for
the modification will likely mean that recommended sentences in
future cases better fit the judge's views on fairness.201
a. "Take-it-or-leave-it" Pleas. In "take-it-or-leave-it" plea
agreements, the court can choose only between accepting or
rejecting the agreement entirely, which poses a more difficult
question. When the court finds that the parties' agreement does
not serve the prosecutor's public-client's interests, the court should
reject the plea agreement.202 Whether the court concludes that the
proposed sentence was too lenient or too harsh or simply that the
defendant was not treated fairly in a particular way, the court
should explain its reasoning to the lawyers in open court. The
lawyers will then likely respond with a proposed sentence much
more to the court's liking in that case and others.203 Of course it is
possible that a frustrated prosecutor could use the judge's rejection
as motivation to charge the case in a way that would guarantee a
197 King & Wright, supra note 16, at 341-42, 376.
1s8 See generally Mark W. Bennett, Confronting Cognitive "Anchoring Effect" and "Blind
Spot" Biases in Federal Sentencing: A Modest Solution for Reforming A Fundamental Flaw,
104 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 489 (2014).
199 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1)(B).
200 See, e.g., United States v. Orthofix, Inc., 956 F. Supp. 2d 316, 322 (D. Mass. 2013)
("Just as the Court must take account of the public interest when it exercises its discretion
to fashion its own sentence, so too the Court must take account of the public interest when
called upon to review a sentencing recommendation attached to a plea bargain.").
201 See Schulhofer, supra note 54, at 745.
202 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(5) (providing procedures in the event the court rejects a take-
it-or-leave-it plea).
203 See Schulhofer, supra note 54, at 745; see also Hillary A. Sale, Judges W'ho Settle, 89
WASH. U. L. REV. 377, 403 (2011) (explaining that judges reviewing securities class actions
and derivative suits who occasionally reject settlements will create pressure for parties to
provide better records and that simply asking deeper questions of the lawyers will also
improve settlement records that come before courts).
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harsher sentence, such as through a mandatory minimum, but
that would risk seriously invoking the judge's ire and may be
unconstitutional.20 4
Although judges do not often reject take-it-or-leave-it plea
agreements, United States v. Sharper205 provides one prominent
example to consider. There, Judge Milazzo rejected a take-it-or-
leave-it plea by a famous defendant that included a sentence of
more than six years below the bottom of the guidelines range on
charges involving the rape of numerous women through the use of
pharmaceutical drugs.206 The judge explained that a substantial
downward variance from the guidelines range would not "reflect
the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, or
provide just punishment for the offense."207  Judge Milazzo
eventually sentenced Darren Sharper to 220 months'
imprisonment-more than nine years longer than the sentence
from the original "C" plea.208 A more detailed explanation of why
the originally-proposed nine-year sentence was unduly lenient and
a request that the prosecutor to justify the substantial downward
variance before rejecting the "C" plea would have improved
accountability. But reaching the sentence she thought right by
rejecting the "C" plea is the most important part of what Judge
Milazzo did. Separation of powers and prosecutors' substantial
leverage make judges' decisions to reject "C" pleas as unduly harsh
sit more comfortably than decisions to reject them as unduly
lenient, but the fact that the originally-proposed sentence was well
below the guidelines range without any offered justification lends
credence to the court's decision.
204 This scenario begins to steer somewhat close to the rule that prosecutors cannot indict
a defendant on a more serious charge for the same conduct in response to a defendant
appealing a conviction. Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28-29 (1974).
205 No. 14-CR-284 (E.D. La. 2016).
206 Transcript of Plea Hearing at 9-10, United States v. Sharper, No. 14-CR-284 (E.D. La.
Feb. 18, 2016), ECF No. 259.
207 Id. at 10.
208 Judgment in a Criminal Case at 3, Sharper, No. 14-CR-284 (E.D. La. Aug. 18, 2016)
ECF No. 505. The term "C" plea refers to a plea agreement entered under Rule 11(c)(1)(C)
where a judge can only take the plea agreement as reached or reject it entirely. The
original plea agreement provided for a sentence of 108 months. Transcript of Plea Hearing
at 9, Sharper, No. 14-CR-284 (E.D. La. Feb. 18, 2106), ECF No. 259.
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b. Improving Information. In some instances, no matter
what they think of the substantive fairness of the deal, judges'
hands are tied at sentencing because the prosecutor charged the
case to trigger a mandatory minimum or sentencing
enhancement.209 When the legislature has authorized prosecutors
to control sentencing this way, allowing judges to displace
prosecutors' charging decisions, as one scholar has suggested,210
would violate the separation of powers.211 Rather, when judges
have concerns about prosecutors' charging and plea decisions they
should articulate those concerns and should ask prosecutors to
justify those decisions on the record in open court-a tactic that
judges have employed in a few cases discussed in this section.212
The remainder of this section theorizes a few instances where
judges have articulated their concerns with prosecutors' charging
decisions and where those judges asked for justifications from the
prosecutor as proposed here; it seeks to encourage other judges to
act similarly when they have cause for concern. Judges generating
information by providing their views and helping create a record of
the prosecutor's justification will help combat the information
209 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
210 See Alschuler, supra note 7, at 1125 n.220, 1147 (arguing for judges to be able to reduce
the level or number of charges against a defendant to reach the appropriate sentence).
211 At least in the state context, New Jersey courts invalidated mandatory minimums as
trampling on judicial sentencing authority. See State v. Lagares, 601 A.2d 698, 701-05 (N.J.
1992) (holding that state's repeat-offender statute, which required a court to impose a period
of parole ineligibility at the prosecutor's request, would violate the separation of powers
doctrine unless interpreted to give courts more authority over the decision); State v. Vasquez,
609 A.2d 29, 32-33 (N.J. 1992) (interpreting the statute in a similar manner as in Lagares to
avoid a violation of separation of powers); see also Wright, supra note 91, at 1091-93
(describing this body of case law). But a similar ruling seems rather unlikely in the federal
context. Indeed, there is reason to think that separation of powers applies more strongly in
the federal criminal system than in state systems. See Brown, supra note 87, at 1242-53.
212 See Andrew D. Bradt & D. Theodore Rave, The Information-Forcing Role of the Judge in
Multidistrict Litigation, 105 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming) (suggesting that a judge in
multidistrict litigation who has concerns about the fairness of an aggregate settlement should
articulate those concerns to aid the lawyers' clients, who are often lumped into a large
inventory of people represented by the same lawyer, and pointing to Judge Hellerstein in the
World Trade Center litigation as an example); see also Transcript of Hearing at 54-64, In re
World Trade Center Disaster Site Litig., No. 21 MC 100 (AKH) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2010), ECF
No. 2037 (rejecting the fairness of the non-class aggregate settlement and explaining on the
record his view that too much of the settlement money would go to the lawyers).
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deficit that impedes prosecutor accountability.2 13  Greater
information can facilitate accountability both through internal
checks within prosecutors' offices and by informing voters in
prosecutor elections.214 Moreover, the potential need to justify
decisions on the record encourages prosecutors to engage in more-
reasoned deliberation ex ante and thus helps debias their
decisionmaking.215
New Jersey's Supreme Court took a particularly strong
approach to improving prosecutor accountability: requiring
prosecutors to routinely justify decisions about sentencing
enhancements.216  Because of the disparities that decisions to
charge sentencing enhancements created, the court required the
Attorney General's Office to promulgate guidelines about when
sentencing enhancements should apply.2 1 7  It also required
prosecutors to state a reason on the record for the decision to
charge a sentencing enhancement, and it made this reason subject
to judicial review.218 When prosecutors failed to provide reasons or
simply provided reasons not rooted in the statewide guidelines to
support the decision to charge an enhancement, New Jersey courts
remanded those cases;219 so too did the New Jersey courts readily
213 Although the focus of the article is on accountability, encouraging judges to express their
concerns on the record may also help defendants feel that their concerns have been heard.
214 See Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation, supra note 7, at 983 ("Though in theory
prosecutors serve the public interest, the public cannot monitor whether they are in fact
serving the public well.... Members of the public have sparse and unreliable information
about how well prosecutors perform."); Gold, Promoting Democracy in Prosecution, supra
note 57, at 78-79 ("Poor information flow between prosecutors and the public renders the
political check ineffective."); Gold, "Clientless" Lawyers, supra note 1, at 117-26 (explaining
the lack of public information regarding prosecutor performance); see also Cassidy, supra
note 88, at 1018 ("Prosecutors in the United States earn very low grades for any kind of
transparency, internal or external."). Internal administrative process cannot work without
information flow either, though the information there need not necessarily be made public.
215 See Oren Bar-Gill & Barry Friedman, Taking Warrants Seriously, 106 Nw. U. L. REV.
1609, 1641-47 (2012) (explaining social science theory in the context of police applying for
search warrants on why anticipating having to justify a decision ex post debiases
decisionmaking ex ante).
216 See Wright, supra note 91, at 1090-98 (describing the evolution of this case law);
Wright, supra note 90, at 1030-32 (same).
217 See State v. Lagares, 601 A.2d 698, 704 (N.J. 1992).
218 See id. at 704-05.
2s See State v. Maldonado, 715 A.2d 996, 999 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998) (remanding
for statement of reasons due to lack of explanation by prosecutor for denying defendant's
entry into a pretrial intervention program); State v. Perez, 701 A.2d 750, 752-53 (N.J.
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affirm mandatory enhancements when the prosecutors gave
reasons rooted in the guidelines.220 This approach did not offend
separation of powers, the court explained, because sentencing is a
traditional judicial function.221
California's Supreme Court held that judges retain authority to
impose sentences that serve the interests of justice even when
imposing such sentences means ignoring the defendant's prior
"strikes" under the "three strikes" law.2 2 2 Although the statutory
language seemed to require judges to impose a life sentence for
felons with two prior serious or violent felonies when so-charged
by the prosecutor,223 the court held that a judge can depart from
three-strikes sentencing without the prosecutor so requesting.224
This Article does not go so far as to propose judicial review of
prosecutors' reasons or to allow judges to refuse to impose
sentencing enhancements that prosecutors have charged as New
Jersey and California do, though that might make sense in some
state systems depending on each system's conception of its
horizontal separation of powers;225 it instead encourages judges to
exercise judgment in individual cases by raising any concerns on
the record and asking prosecutors to justify their decisions on the
record.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997) (remanding because prosecutor did not file statement of reasons);
State v. Press, 651 A.2d 1068, 1072 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995) (remanding because
prosecutor did not explain refusal to waive mandatory minimum punishment for dugs
within school zone).
220 Wright, supra note 91, at 1095 & n.35; see also, e.g., State v. Kirk, 678 A.2d 233, 238-
39 (N.J. 1996) (holding that state sufficiently explained its reasoning on the record and
cited ample evidence demonstrating an escalating pattern of drug activity).
221 State v. Leonardis, 375 A.2d 607, 612 n.4 (N.J. 1977); see also Lagares, 601 A.2d at
701-05 (holding that prosecutors' power over sentencing enhancements violated separation
of powers because it displaced judges' power over sentencing).
222 See People v. Romero, 917 P.2d 628, 639-49 (Cal. 1996).
223 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (West current through 2017) ("[Ilf a defendant has two or
more prior serious and/or violent felony convictions . . . the term for the current felony
conviction shall be an indeterminate term of life imprisonment. . . ." (emphasis added)).
224 Romero, 917 P.2d at 646-47.
225 Cf. Brown, supra note 87, at 1253 (explaining that separation of powers notions of
prosecutorial discretion as a purely executive function are historically weaker in the states
than in the federal system).
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A few examples from federal cases provide a closer illustration
of what is urged here.2 2 6 In United States v. Doutre, the prosecutor
filed two prior felony informations in a drug case, resulting in a
mandatory life sentence.227 Judge Saris-Chair of the United
States Sentencing Commission-questioned that prosecutor's
decision in open court, saying, "I'm just trying to understand why
this is . . . why you think this is just."228 In response, the
prosecutor admittedly did not "address [the court's] question of
justness" but instead explained that he needed to maintain the two
prior felony informations with which he threatened to trigger a life
sentence because to do otherwise would undermine his
credibility.229 Eventually the prosecutor made a record of the
defendant's history as "a dedicated drug trafficker all his life,"
though even he then recognized that "it's hard to say that any
defendant warrants a life sentence in a drug case-and I can
understand the Court's consternation with respect to the sentence
here."2 3 0 Judge Saris then explained to the defendant that he did
indeed deserve a "hefty sentence," and that she had no choice but
to sentence him to life-a sentence she had never given for a drug
crime-because of the prosecutor's decision to proceed with two
felony informations, although she was "troubled by" that
sentence.231
Former federal prosecutor and then-Judge Gleeson exemplified
this information-forcing role in a written opinion in United States
v. Dossie.232 First, Judge Gleeson questioned the prosecutor on the
record as to why Dossie, "a young, small-time, street-level drug
dealer's assistant" warranted the five-year mandatory
226 This Article provides a few examples of cases where judges have employed the
approach suggested here, but there are assuredly others. See, e.g., King & Wright, supra
note 16, at 366 (recounting interviews with judges who explained the role that they played
in helping resolve criminal cases by asking prosecutors questions such as why the public
should pay to house a defendant for a long time when she does not present a danger).
227 Transcript of Sentencing, at 3-4, United States v. Doutre, No. 08-CR-10215-PBX (D.
Mass. Mar. 22, 2010), ECF No. 168.
228 Id. at 4.
229 Id. at 4-5.
230 Id. at 10-11.
221 Id. at 13.
232 United States v. Dossie, 851 F. Supp. 2d 478 (E.D.N.Y. 2012).
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minimum.233  Having then questioned the prosecutor on the
record, Judge Gleeson imposed the mandatory five-year sentence
and wrote an opinion explaining that "[t]he only reason for the
five-year sentence imposed on Dossie is that the law invoked by
the prosecutor required it. It was not a just sentence."234 In
United States v. Kupa, Judge Gleeson took the time to explain in
writing that he was able to impose a sentence of eleven years'
imprisonment only because, at the last minute, the defendant
decided to plead guilty so that the prosecutor would withdraw the
prior felony information that would have otherwise required life
imprisonment.235 He revealed those heavy-handed tactics that
would otherwise have remained cloaked in the secrecy of plea
bargaining.236
Had Kupa not caved under the Damoclean pressure of a life
sentence, he would have ended up like Paul Lewis Hayes-a man
whose fate is known to many students of criminal procedure.
Hayes was charged with uttering a forged instrument for less than
$100, a crime punishable by two to ten years' imprisonment.2 3 7
When he refused to plead guilty, the prosecutor charged him
instead as a habitual criminal just as he had promised in open
court, which carried a mandatory life sentence in Kentucky.238
The Supreme Court ultimately upheld this life sentence for an $88
233 Id. at 481, 484.
234 Id. at 489.
236 United States v. Kupa, 976 F. Supp. 2d 417, 459 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (explaining that the
only reason the court could impose this lesser sentence was because "Kupa buckled under
the enormous pressure that looming [life] sentence placed on him").
236 Somewhat similarly, see a recent dissent in the Supreme Court of Louisiana. State v.
Howard, No. 2015-KO-1404, at 1 (La. May 3, 2017) (Johnson, C.J., dissenting) ("I find it
outrageous that defendant's conviction of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute,
and sentence of 18 years imprisonment without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension
of sentence, resulting from the discovery of a mere 18 grams of marijuana, will be allowed to
stand. Considering the rapidly relaxing social attitudes toward the use of marijuana, the
increasing number of states whose voters have approved the recreational use of marijuana,
and changing laws (even in Louisiana) providing more lenient penalties relative to
marijuana possession, the result of this case is even more ridiculous." (footnotes omitted)).
The extremely long sentence in that case resulted from a habitual felon penalty to which
the defendant agreed when faced with a much harsher habitual felon penalty if he had not.
See Howard, No. 2015-KO-1404, at 2 (per curiam).
237 Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 358 (1978).
2% Id. at 358-59.
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forgery.239 What's unusual about Bordenkircher v. Hayes is that
the threat of a mandatory life sentence instead of the five years
the prosecutor intended to recommend had Hayes pleaded guilty
was on the record in open court and that Hayes gambled with a
life sentence hanging over his head. But it is hard to see how
dangling a life sentence over the head of someone who the
prosecutor was content to give five years' imprisonment represents
the prosecutor's public-client well. It is harder still to understand
pursuing that charge to conviction and requiring taxpayers to fund
that life sentence.
State and local prosecutors hold similarly-heavy hammers in
the form of mandatory minimum sentences or sentencing
enhancements that they can charge and dismiss at their
discretion.240 Bordenkircher was a state prosecution.24 1 Consider
another extreme example. From 1980 until the mid-1990's,
Georgia imposed a mandatory minimum of life imprisonment for a
second conviction of the sale or possession with intent to distribute
a controlled substance.242  A prosecutor operating under that
statute could charge simple possession instead of possession with
intent to distribute, which, even with a prior offense would have
yielded a mandatory minimum sentence of five years'
imprisonment instead of mandatory life imprisonment.243 Or the
prosecutor could avoid mentioning the defendant's prior offense,
which also would have triggered only the five-year mandatory
239 See id. at 365.
240 See Cassidy, supra note 88, at 1000 ("When prosecutors have discretion to charge a
defendant with a crime carrying a harsh mandatory penalty and then allow the defendant
to plead guilty to a lesser crime carrying a discretionary and lower penalty, this disparity
may exert unconscionable pressure on the defendant."); see also Stephanos Bibas, Plea
Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2464, 2487 (2004) (explaining
that state and federal "sentencing guidelines and statutes act as sledgehammers rather
than scalpels").
241 Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 358-59.
242 See Georgia Controlled Substances Act Amended, No. 888, § 1(d), 1980 Ga. Laws 432,
432-33; see also Stephens v. State, 456 S.E.2d 560, 560 (Ga. 1995) (quoting statute then in
effect). The mandatory minimum was substantially lowered in 1996. See Act of Apr. 15,
1996, No. 932, § 1.1, 1996 Ga. Laws 1023, 1023-24.
243 Act of Mar. 20, 1980, No. 888, § 1(c), 1980 Ga. Laws 432, 433. Without the prior
offense the defendant would have been eligible for a diversion program. Act of Mar. 31,
1976, No. 1185, § 1, 1976 Ga. Laws 1083, 1085-86.
7432017)
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW
minimum.244 Of course, the prosecutor could also always charge
nothing. Georgia prosecutors during this time had an incredible
menu of options with consequences to the defendant ranging from
avoiding all criminal process; undergoing some process but
avoiding a conviction; or going to prison for at least two years, five
years, or life.
I am not arguing that Judge Saris is right that Doutre did not
deserve a life sentence for a drug charge or that Judge Gleeson is
right about hydraulic leverage of prior felony informations
coercing guilty pleas, though I tend to think they both are.
Rather, the point is that sentence length and plea differentials
pose difficult public policy questions. So it makes some sense to
leave them to the democratic process. But leaving these questions
to the democratic process does not entail a passive judicial role in
the way we typically expect. Rather, judges need to create a
record of these instances that voters and prosecutors' supervisors
can evaluate. Legislators tend to cover themselves on these
challenging questions by ceding massive authority to prosecutors
who are then asked to do the right thing in individual cases.245
Thus, for the democratic process to play a meaningful role in
resolving these questions, electing prosecutors would seem to be
the best hope. But voters often have far too little information
when they vote for prosecutors, and thus prosecutor elections do
not typically provide a meaningful sense of voter priorities.246 For
federal prosecutors who are not elected, the best hope for
accountability comes from within the executive branch, but that
too requires information.247 And judges are in the best position to
facilitate this information.
Judges giving voice to injustices that they cannot correct will
help facilitate internal and external accountability. In the federal
system, the Attorney General has recently instructed federal
244 See Act of Mar. 20, 1980 § 1(d).
245 See Stuntz, supra note 62, at 506 (noting that criminal law empowers prosecutors to be
the "criminal justice system's real lawmakers").
246 Gold, Promoting Democracy in Prosecution, supra note 57, at 78-79; Wright, supra
note 110, at 582.
247 See Barkow, supra note 6, at 871 (noting the lack of an effective legal check on




prosecutors to charge mandatory minimums whenever available
(subject to rare exception).248 Under Attorney General Sessions,
instances where judges explain that prosecutors have charged a
case to trigger too harsh of a sentence are quite unlikely to trigger
any response within the Department of Justice. But voters will
have no access to information about how this approach plays out in
practice unless judges draw attention to particular cases. And
most criminal law in the United States comes from the states,
where many jurisdictions-including some of the most populous-
seem poised to approach charging quite differently than Sessions
as evident in part based on an open letter that many district
attorneys signed expressing their disagreement with the Sessions
charging memo.2 4 9 Predictions are always tricky, but in a city like
Philadelphia where a civil rights lawyer has won the Democratic
nomination for District Attorney (and presumptively the general
election in such a heavily Democratic city) by campaigning in part
on ending mass incarceration,2 50 judges holding prosecutors to
account for being too harsh at sentencing is likely to yield a very
meaningful response from presumptive-incoming-District Attorney
Larry Krasner.251
When the judge should require the prosecutor to create a record
is highly fact-specific and will depend in part on the judge's
experience. For one thing, judges are already reasonably well
equipped to spot what seem like outlier cases that deviate from the
market rate sentence on particular charges.252 And judges could
248 Memorandum from The Attorney General on Department Charging and Sentencing
Policy to All Federal Prosecutors (May 10, 2017), https://assets.documentcloud.org/docume
nts/3719168/Sessions-Charging-Memo.pdf [hereinafter Sessions Memo].
249 Linsey Bever, Prosecutors are pushing back against Sessions order to pursue most
severe penalties, WASH. POST, May 19, 2017.
250 Maura Ewing, The Progressive Civil-Rights Lawyer Philadelphia Wants for District
Attorney, THE ATLANTIC, May 16, 2017), http://theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/05/phila
delphia-district-attorney-election-reformi/526812.
251 Something similar might occur with recently-elected District Attorney Kim Ogg in
Houston. See Casey Tolan & Rebecca McCray, Making Freedom Free, SLATE, Mar. 29, 2017,
http://www.slate.com/articles/news-andpolitics/trials-anderror/2017/03/poor-defendants-get
locked-up becausethey_can t affordcash bailhere-s.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2017)
(describing Ogg's opposition to using cash bail as a default recommendation).
252 Scott & Stuntz, supra note 22, at 1959.
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be better equipped still to spot those outliers if court clerk's offices
collected data on point.
But beyond simply looking for cases that deviate from the
market rate, judges should keep a particularly close eye on cases
where sentencing enhancements or mandatory minimums are
charged. These cases find the prosecutor's power at its apex,
wielding a crude instrument; they are thus most in need of
checking.253  Sometimes hefty enhancements or mandatory
minimums will fit the crime. Sometimes they won't. Congress
sought to impose hefty sentencing enhancements based on the role
that an offender played in a drug conspiracy.254 But Congress took
a shortcut by tying enhancements to drug quantity as a proxy for
role, which led to misfits and the potential for government
manipulation.2 5 5 It remains to be seen how federal prosecutors
will implement the Attorney General's charging memo requiring
prosecutors to charge mandatory minimums when available except
in extenuating circumstances that require explanation and
approval.256 But it seems quite likely that prosecutors will follow
by filing more charges that carry mandatory minimums.
253 See supra notes 240-47 and accompanying text.
25 See United States v. Dossie, 851 F. Supp. 2d 478, 479-81 (E.D.N.Y. 2012).
255 See id. at 480-81 (explaining that drug quantity does not always indicate one's role in
a drug conspiracy and that the DOJ has employed these mandatory minimums without
regard to their purpose of penalizing defendants with supervisory rules in these
conspiracies); Eda Katharine Tinto, Undercover Policing, Overstated Culpability, 34
CARDOZO L. REV. 1401, 1413-14 (2013) (describing "sentencing manipulation" by the
government that occurs in part through manipulating drug quantity).
256 Sessions Memo (providing that prosecutors should charge the "most serious, readily
provable offense," which it defines as "those that carry the most substantial guidelines
sentence, including mandatory minimum sentences"). This is a marked departure from the
fact-specific, case-sensitive approach that the Obama administration took to charging
mandatory minimums and prior felony enhancements. See Memorandum from The Attorney
General on Department Policy on Charging Mandatory Minimum Sentences and Recidivist
Enhancements in Certain Drug Cases to the United States Attorneys and Assistant Attorney
General for the Criminal Division at 2-3 (Aug. 12, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/
files/ag/legacy/2014/04/11/ag-memo-drug-guidance.pdf ("We must ensure that our most severe
mandatory minimum penalties are reserved for serious, high-level, or violent drug
traffickers.... Long sentences for low-level, non-violent drug offenses do not promote public
safety, deterrence, and rehabilitation.... Recidivist Enhancements: Prosecutors should
decline to file an information pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851 unless the defendant is involved in
conduct that makes the case appropriate for severe sanctions.").
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Drawing again on the class action regime and circling back to
an earlier portion of this Article, the judge can also examine the
plea bargaining process to help illuminate cases of particular
concern.257 In sum, when the judge inquires in detail about the
plea bargaining process before accepting the plea, some types of
facts should give a judge pause: cases where the parties have
exchanged little or no information, any evidence of collusion, cases
where the prosecutor threatened to charge a mandatory minimum
or sentencing enhancement, and cases with exploding plea offers.
This idea of information-forcing to allow the democratic process
to competently resolve difficult policy questions animates much of
environmental law. The National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) requires federal agencies to create environmental
assessments and, when necessary, environmental impact
statements documenting the environmental effect of proposed
actions.258 It does not impose substantive boundaries on what the
federal government can do but instead requires disclosure of the
anticipated effects so that voters can evaluate various competing
interests for themselves.259 Of course, most voters do not actually
pore over the Federal Register and read environmental impact
statements; they rely instead on relevant interest groups or
political candidates to cull those documents. The courts' job in the
NEPA context is simply to ensure the sufficiency of the
disclosure.260  Although without the same explicit legislative
authorization as in NEPA, judges in criminal courts can and
should embrace a similar task of requiring the government-
through the prosecutor-to create a record of its reasoning when
the judge has cause for concern about a prosecutor's charging or
267 See supra Section IV.A. 1.
258 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, § 102, 83 Stat. 852, 853
(1970); see also 40 C.F.R. § 1501.3 (1978).
259 See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350-51 (1989); Helen
Leanne Serassio, Legislative and Executive Efforts to Modernize NEPA and Create
Efficiencies in Environmental Review, 45 TEx. ENVTL. L.J. 317, 319 (2015); see also Albert C.
Lin, Clinton's National Monuments: A Democrat's Undemocratic Acts?, 29 ECOLOGY L.Q.
707, 732 (2002); Lorna Jorgensen, Note, The Move Toward Participatory Democracy in
Public Land Management Under NEPA- Is it Being Thwarted by the ESA?, 20 J. LAND
RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 311, 315 (2000).
260 Serassio, supra note 259, at 335-36, 355 n.138.
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plea bargaining decisions. As with NEPA, improving information
flow can improve accountability.
Ultimately, courts cannot displace mandatory minimum
sentences or sentencing enhancements that legislatures have
authorized and prosecutors have charged. But if harsh tactics to
induce guilty pleas move from courthouse hallways to open
courtrooms on a written record, so much the better.261 Sunshine
may help disinfect that process. Nowhere is criminal justice
opacity more pronounced than in plea bargaining.262  Judges
requiring prosecutors to make a record of their plea bargaining
behavior and the bases for what seem like questionable charging
decisions would help inform voters and candidates challenging
incumbent prosecutors and would thus help improve prosecutors'
accountability to their public-client.
So too should the judge allow a defense attorney to create a
record regarding the appropriateness of the charges or the plea
bargaining based on the specific facts of the case. The question
may arise why the judge should play an active managerial role
here when the defense attorney would seemingly have sufficient
incentive to voice her concerns. In part, the answer is that the
defense attorney is highly unlikely to actually gain any benefit for
her particular client from contesting the appropriateness of the
prosecutor's charging decisions.263 Moreover, defense attorneys
may fear that calling the prosecutor to account on the record for
261 See Jocelyn Simonson, The Criminal Court Audience in a Post-Trial World, 127 HARV.
L. REV. 2173, 2197-2202 (2014) (explaining the importance of publicity to restrain abuse of
power and enhance democratic self-governance); Wright & Miller, Honesty and Opacity,
supra note 85, at 1410-11 (criticizing the harmful nature of charge bargains due to their
lack of transparency and immense pressure on defendants to plead guilty).
262 See Bowers, supra note 157, at 1710 (discussing the insulated nature of plea
bargaining); Levine, supra note 152, at 1479 ("Because prosecutors have so much discretion
when it comes to charging, and because so many criminal cases are resolved by plea
bargaining, prosecutors are more critical than judges when it comes to the appearance of
justice in the criminal justice system"); see also Scott & Stuntz, supra note 22, at 1911
(describing "scandalously casual" plea bargaining comprised of "a quick conversation in a
prosecutor's office or a courthouse hallway between attorneys familiar with only the basics
of the case, with no witnesses present").
263 Cf. Bibas, supra note 240, at 2486 ('The federal Sentencing Guidelines significantly
discount the sentences of defendants who accept responsibility in a timely manner, typically
by pleading guilty. Defendants whose lawyers take extensive discovery or file many motions
may suffer retaliation by judges and prosecutors and thus lose some or all of this discount.").
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her unfair or inappropriate decisions will impair their future
clients' interests. The judge then is in an important position
because she need not fear retaliation from the prosecutor and thus
may need to speak up in cases where the defense attorney will not.
B. CONSIDERING OTHER MECHANISMS
Regulating plea agreements solely ex post conflicts with well-
recognized concerns about judges' docket-management incentives
and informational deficits that scholars have recognized in both
criminal law and class action scholarship.264 Class action scholars
recognize that judges have little incentive to rigorously scrutinize
class action settlements because approving the settlement means
clearing the case from the docket and rejecting it may mean the
plaintiffs reformulate their proposed class rather than folding
their tent and going home.2 65 Criminal law scholars too recognize
that the docket-clearing incentive tends to mean that judges are
unlikely to reject too many plea agreements ex post because
accepting the plea agreement means clearing the case;2 66 rejecting
the plea agreement, by contrast, may mean keeping the case on
the docket.26 7
Purely ex post review is likely to prove even less potent in
criminal law than in class actions because of the difference
between the import of the charging decision in criminal law and
the civil filing decision. In criminal law, charging a case in certain
ways can give the government massive leverage to induce a plea
264 See, e.g., Issacharoff, supra note 138, at 829 (explaining judges' docket management
incentives to approve class settlements); Wright & Miller, Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff,
supra note 85, at 88 ('The judge is complicit with the parties after they reach a plea
agreement.").
265 Issacharoff, supra note 138, at 829; Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The
Plaintiffs'Attorney's Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and
Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 45-46 (1991); Nagareda, supra note 64,
at 968; Rubenstein, supra note 195, at 1445.
266 Laura I Appleman, Who Watches the Watchers? Judges, Guilty Pleas, and Outsider
Review, 66 FLA. L. REV. F. 44, 45 (2015); McConkie, supra note 7, at 64, 69; Rakoff, supra
note 7.
267 When the parties present the court with a "take-it-or-leave-it" plea, FED. R. CRIM. P.
11(c)(1)(C), rejecting the plea means that the case will continue and may in fact proceed to
trial.
2017] 749
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:693
and substantially affect the possible resulting sentence,268
including controlling decades of a defendant's liberty in a way that
makes "blackmail settlements" and "hydraulic pressure" in class
actions seem like child's play.269 Harsh mandatory minimums and
sentencing enhancements that may be invoked at prosecutors'
options mean that prosecutors hold the keys to sentencing, by and
large.270 Prosecutors can induce defendantS271 into waiving rights
by creating an immense sentencing differential between
convictions after a plea versus trial such that trial becomes far too
risky.272  Of course, the possibility of trial can serve as a
theoretical check on this behavior, but substantive criminal law is
so broad and deep that this check is exceptionally weak.2 7 3
By contrast, a civil complaint can be amended and superseded,
and it has no great weight on the force of any settlement
discussions except insofar as it provides basic notice to the
defendant of the claims and the proposed scope of the class.
Moreover, the class-client's rights can be affected only when a
class is certified,274 and the complaint itself necessarily precedes
any certification order.
268 See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
269 See, e.g., Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 164 (3d
Cir. 2001) (describing "hydraulic pressure" to settle); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51
F.3d 1293, 1299-1300 (7th Cir. 1995) (describing the so-called "blackmail settlement"
concern). But see generally Charles Silver, "We're Scared to Death"` Class Certification and
Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1357 (2003) (arguing that none of the various iterations of the
blackmail settlement narrative are persuasive).
270 See supra notes 7, 83-91 and accompanying text.
271 See Susan R. Klein, Enhancing the Judicial Role in Criminal Plea and Sentence
Bargaining, 84 TEX. L. REV. 2023, 2037-38 (2006) (describing various "clubs" that prosecutors
possess in plea bargaining); see also United States v. Kupa, 976 F. Supp. 2d 417, 420 (E.D.N.Y.
2013) (describing sentencing enhancements as "produc[ing] the sentencing equivalent of a two-
by-four to the forehead"); Rakoff, supra note 7 (describing weapons with which prosecutors can
"bludgeon defendants into effectively coerced plea bargains").
272 Kupa, 976 F. Supp. 2d at 420 ("To coerce guilty pleas, and sometimes to coerce
cooperation as well, prosecutors routinely threaten ultra-harsh, enhanced mandatory
sentences that no one-not even the prosecutors themselves-thinks are appropriate."); id.
("The government's use of [prior felony informations] coerces guilty pleas and produces
sentences so excessively severe they take your breath away."); Bibas, Prosecutorial
Regulation, supra note 7, at 971 ("Courts find no problem even when prosecutors use
coercive sentencing differentials as plea-bargaining leverage.").
273 See Stuntz, supra note 62, at 512-23.
274 E.g., Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, 133 S. Ct. 1345, 1349 (2013); Smith v. Bayer
Corp., 564 U.S. 299, 314-15 (2011).
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If class certification is eventually sought without a concurrent
settlement proposal,275 the court will benefit from a defendant's
brief opposing certification. There is no analog to the class
certification motion on the criminal side and no analogous
opportunity for someone to put information before the court that
could imperil a deal, at least as a formal matter.276
Differences in methods of judicial selection and political
pressures discussed above also mean that earlier judicial review is
likely to be more necessary in the criminal context to check
prosecutors than in the class action context to check class
counsel.277 Thus, a judicial check on prosecutors that functions
much like the one on class counsel would add some value278 but not
as much as a multi-stage process of judicial involvement.279
For these reasons, judicial involvement in the criminal process
would be more effective if it came earlier than it does in class
actions, and multiple stages of judicial involvement take on
particular importance.
1. Judicial Involvement During Plea Bargaining. To create a
more robust role for judges to check prosecutors, judges can play
an important role during the plea negotiation process. Contrary to
the federal rules, some state judges mediate criminal cases.280 In
so doing, just as with their ex post fairness review, judges should
inquire about the process of the negotiation, including any offers or
threats between the lawyers.281
275 The timing is not uniform from case to case. The complaint can be filed concurrently with
a proposed settlement and motion for class certification; the complaint can precede a joint
filing of a motion for class certification and settlement approval; or the complaint, motion for
class certification, and motion for settlement approval can all be filed consecutively.
276 On rare occasion some members of the public may provide unsolicited criticism. See,
e.g., HSBC Bank USA, N.A, 2013 WL 3306161, at *7.
277 See supra Part IlI.
278 See Stuntz, supra note 62, at 540 (arguing that elected judges feel less pressure to
please the public than do elected prosecutors or legislators).
279 Cf Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Judicial Participation in Plea Negotiations: A Comparative
View, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 199, 266 (2006) ("[P]assive, after-the-fact review of the plea by the
judge has not provided a sufficient safeguard of the important public interests in fair and
accurate outcomes.").
280 See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
281 See supra notes 148-49 and accompanying text.
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The federal criminal rules have barred judicial involvement in
plea negotiations since 1974,282 while the federal civil rules have
been amended since then to create "managerial judges" who
actively work to settle cases.283  The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure afford substantial case management tools to drive
parties toward settlement.284 The suggestion in this part of the
Article is to bring the federal criminal rule closer to its civil
counterpart and closer to the practice in some states.285
States' approaches vary on judicial involvement in plea
bargaining.286 Plenty of states ban judicial involvement entirely.287
But twenty-one states allow judicial participation in settlement,
and nine of those states actively encourage it.288 Eleven other
states do not explicitly bar judicial participation in plea bargaining
but have not ruled on the issue.289 Unsurprisingly, the forms of
judicial participation vary. At least some counties in eight of the
ten jurisdictions studied in Nancy King and Ron Wright's recent
qualitative project routinely hold early settlement conferences.290
In many of these jurisdictions, defendants and victims are not
282 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 advisory committee's note to 1974 amendment ("Subdivision
(e)(1) prohibits the court from participating in plea discussions.").
283 See FED. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory committee's note to 1983 amendment (discussing the
amendments expansion of pretrial judicial management); see also Gold et al., supra note 9
(discussing the role of judges in promoting settlements). Civil Rule 16 is not focused on
class actions as most of this comparison has been, but it applies equally in that context.
284 See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 16(a)(5) (allowing pretrial conferences with the explicit objective
of "facilitating settlement); Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cases Settle'" Judicial
Promotion and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1342-46 (1994) (discussing
judges' ability to take on the role of manager in the early phases of civil litigation).
ml See supra note 226 and accompanying text. But see ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON
CRIMINAL RULES, MINUTES OF NOVEMBER 2014 MEETING 2-9 (reporting discussion and
rejection by a vote of six to four of proposal to amend Rule 11 to allow judicial participation
in plea bargaining).
86 See Wright & Miller, Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, supra note 85, at 89 & n.224 ("To
give defendants more complete and reliable information, a growing number of states
encourage rather than forbid judicial involvement in plea discussions." (collecting sources)).
See generally King & Wright, supra note 16 (reporting results of interviews with
participants in ten different states); Turner, supra note 279 (comparing German system to
Florida and Connecticut systems of judicial involvement in plea negotiations).
28 See Batra, supra note 16, at 573-75 (listing states with this prohibition, either by
statute or court rule).
28 Id. at 575-78.
289 Id. at 577-78.
2N King & Wright, supra note 16, at 337-43.
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present for these conferences.291  In a few others, however,
defendants are present, which allows the defendant to hear
directly from the judge and see how her case is resolved;292 the
defendant's presence also humanizes her for the judge and
prosecutor.293 As an administrative matter, some courts direct
cases onto settlement dockets or trial dockets.294 Some courts in
Oregon and Kansas assign cases to mediation, just as some civil
local rules require alternative dispute resolution.295 Connecticut
judges play a very active role, moderating between the parties'
positions and sometimes directly offering views on a plea offer's
merits.296
As in civil cases, judges in criminal cases could hold pretrial
plea bargain conferences in which the judge talks to both sides'
lawyers about the offers each has made or would be willing to
make.2 9 7 Because of prosecutors' leverage over defendants, judges
should also keep a watchful eye on the use or threatened use of the
prosecutors' heavy sentencing artillery such as prior felony
enhancements.2 9 8 One of the most concerning facets of sentencing
enhancements is the nearly complete lack of transparency if they
are threatened but never used.2 9 9 One objective of this proposal is
to create a record of this behavior and thereby increase public
291 Id. at 339.
292 Id. at 340.
293 Id.
294 Id. at 343-47.
295 See id. at 351-55 (discussing the policy in some jurisdictions to encourage mediation);
Michael P. Dickey, ADR Gone Wild: Is It Time for a Federal Mediation Exclusionary Rule,
25 OIo ST. J. ON DiSP. RESOL. 713, 770-78 (2010) (listing ADR requirements in each
United States District Court including mandatory mediation rules); see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 652(a) (2012) ("[E]ach district court shall, by local rule adopted under section 2071(a),
require that litigants in all civil cases consider the use of an alternative dispute resolution
process at an appropriate stage in the litigation ... [and] shall provide litigants in all civil
cases with at least one alternative dispute resolution process .....
296 Turner, supra note 279, at 247.
297 In the federal system, this of course contravenes Rule 11 as it is currently written.
298 Concerns about underreach need not be checked during the plea process but rather can
be sufficiently checked by judges reviewing sentence recommendations as it is with class
action settlements. See supra notes 169, 194-98 and accompanying text.
299 See United States v. Kupa, 976 F. Supp. 2d 417, 435 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) ("[Olne of the
many problems associated with tracking the use of prior felony informations is defendants
often plead guilty in response to the threat that one will be filed, producing an outcome that
is very much the result of this prosecutorial power without any record of its use.").
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visibility of a plea negotiation process that frequently operates by
hallway conversations in which defense counsel does not always
make counter-offers and must guess at what the judge might do.3 00
For the sake of visibility and due process, holding these
proceedings in public courtrooms is better than holding them in
chambers.301
Just as managerial civil judges raise normative concerns,302 So
too do managerial criminal judges, and perhaps even more so. 303
But these concerns can be resolved through attention to details of
the proposal rather than a wholesale ban on judicial
involvement.304 Requiring a different judge to preside over trial
than was involved in plea negotiations and being transparent
about this requirement would combat that due process concern.30 5
It could also help if the court's involvement had to await invitation
from one of the parties, as it does in some courts in Florida.3 0 6
Moreover, it is important to keep track of the "compared to what"
question. It seems strange to care deeply about whether an at-
s00 See Roberts & Wright, supra note 161, at 1485-87 (recounting empirical findings
regarding the frequency of counter-offers by defense counsel); see also John G. Douglass,
Fatal Attraction? The Uneasy Courtship of Brady and Plea Bargaining, 50 EMORY L.J. 437,
484 (2001) ("Plea bargains often result from a quick phone call or hallway conversation
between prosecutor and defense counsel."); McConkie, supra note 7, at 82 (arguing that
judicial involvement "would foster transparency, rigor, consistency, and accountability");
Turner, supra note 279, at 238 (arguing that judicial involvement could improve "fairness
and accuracy").
3o1 See King & Wright, supra note 16, at 341 (indicating that some jurisdictions hold these
proceedings in chambers); Simonson, supra note 261, at 2197-2202 (explaining the
importance of open courtrooms for non-trial proceedings).
302 See Resnik, supra note 14, at 403-13.
wo See United States v. Davila, 133 S. Ct. 2139, 2146 (2013) ("the prohibition was included
out of concern that a defendant might be induced to plead guilty rather than risk
displeasing the judge who would preside at trial"); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 advisory
committee's note to 1974 amendment ((explaining that judicial involvement in plea
bargaining "might lead the defendant to believe that he would not receive a fair trial, were
there a trial before the same judge," which "might induce the defendant to plead guilty,
even if innocent").
301 See Alschuler, supra note 7, at 1060.
30 See id. at 1110-11 (arguing for this rule to protect against judicial prejudice and
appearance of impropriety); Wright & Miller, Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, supra note
85, at 88-91 (explaining that this solution would resolve the ostensible conflict and would be
akin to mediators in the civil context).
3os King & Wright, supra note 16, at 349-50, 350 n.144. Awaiting request of both parties
would be too weak of a protection for defendants.
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least-ostensibly-neutral judge will overbear a defendant's will and
force her to plead guilty when prosecutors, whose cognitive biases
cut in favor of harsher treatment,307 can already essentially force a
defendant to plead guilty by threatening to impose a massive
sentencing enhancement if she refuses and when our criminal
justice system regularly allows defendants to be punished at
sentencing for exercising their constitutional right to trial.308
2. Judicial Involvement Before Plea Bargaining. If fairness
review and judicial involvement during the negotiation process
prove insufficient to monitor prosecutors, two scholars have offered
useful mechanisms for judicial involvement before plea bargaining
begins. Under these proposals, plea bargaining would begin, if at
all, only after a defendant's request for a judicial proceeding.309
The probation department would then prepare a limited
presentence report for the hearing.310 This pretrial hearing would
include adversarial presentation of evidence and arguments in
favor of a particular recommended sentence.311 The defendant
should be able to attend the hearing, and a written transcript
should be created.312 The judge would then have a strong basis to
provide a preliminary glimpse into a neutral view of the case's
merits,313 and the judge could announce the sentence that she
30 See Gold, "Clientless" Lawyers, supra note 1, at 104-11.
308 See, e.g., Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation, supra note 7, at 971 ("Courts find no problem
even when prosecutors use coercive sentencing differentials as plea bargaining leverage.").
30 See Alschuler, supra note 7, at 1146-47 (discussing a motion for pretrial conference);
McConkie, supra note 7, at 84 (urging a motion for indicated sentences).
310 See Alschuler, supra note 7, at 1147.
31" Id. at 1147-48.
312 Id.; see also FED. R. CRtw. P. 11 advisory committee's note to 1974 amendment
(explaining the value of transparency by providing that "it is generally agreed that it is
preferable that the fact of the plea agreement be disclosed in open court and its propriety be
reviewed by the trial judge" and criticizing "plea discussions and agreements [that] have
occurred in an informal and largely invisible manner"); see also McConkie, supra note 7, at
75 (arguing that recent Supreme Court decisions about effectiveness of counsel in plea
bargaining encourage creating a written record).
313 Cf. J. Maria Glover, The Federal Rules of Civil Settlement, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1713,
1775-78 (2012) (arguing that civil procedure should embrace its settlement focus by
providing opportunities for judges to weigh the merits of cases earlier to help align
settlement value with merit). See generally Geoffrey P. Miller, Preliminary Judgments,
2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 165 (suggesting an early procedure in a civil case by which the court
could consider all of the evidence that the parties submit and offer its view on the merits of
the claim based on that evidentiary record).
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would impose if the defendant were to plead guilty and the
sentence that she would impose if the defendant were to be
convicted after trial.314
Interestingly, there are at least a few jurisdictions that have
adopted some version of this approach with the two sides
previewing the evidence before the judge provides a preliminary
indication of sentence.315 The idea behind these procedures is for
the initial anchor for the negotiations to come from the judge's
anticipated sentence rather than the prosecutor's opening gambit
and for the defendant to have more information about the merits
of the case against her when deciding to waive her rights.316
Judges can also simply dismiss charges outright where they are
legally insufficient to avoid defendants feeling pressure to plead
guilty when their actions were not in fact illegal.317
On the civil side, the federal rules offer several opportunities for
judges to opine early on a case's merits.318 The opportunities
include motions to dismiss,319 discovery motions,320 pretrial
314 Alschuler, supra note 7, at 1147-48.
315 See King & Wright, supra note 16, at 340-41.
316 See Colin Miller, Anchors Away: Why the Anchoring Effect Suggests That Judges
Should Be Able to Participate in Plea Discussions, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1667, 1667 (2013)
(arguing that judicial involvement helps combat anchoring effects caused by prosecutors
making initial plea offers). Recent empirical work shows that prosecutors typically make
the first offer in plea negotiations. Roberts & Wright, supra note 161, at 1485-87. That
prosecutors make the first offer is particularly important because it means that the lawyers
begin from the prosecutor's starting point even if that starting point was random or
artificially high. See, e.g., Adam D. Galinsky & Thomas Mussweiler, First Offers as
Anchors: The Role of Perspective-Taking and Negotiator Focus, 81 J. PERSONALITY & Soc.
PSYCHOL. 657, 657 (2001) ("[W]e empirically demonstrate for the first time that simply
making a first offer in an actual negotiation affords a distributive advantage because the
first offer serves as an anchor.").
317 See 5 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 11, § 19.3(a) ("The pleading defect of a 'failure to
charge [or "state"] an offense,' or its counterpart of the 'facts stated do not constitute a
public offense' is the one pleading defect specifically recognized in the statutes or court rules
of every state and the federal system."); see also Gold et al., supra note 9 (arguing that
courts should invigorate motions to dismiss in criminal cases).
318 See Gold et al., supra note 9.
319 See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim).
32 See Brooke D. Coleman, The Efficiency Norm, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1777, 1808 (2015)
(recognizing that the creation of discovery 'led to a necessity of judicial refereeing"); Resnik,
supra note 14, at 393 (noting that judges must consider facts and litigation strategies when
ruling on discovery issues).
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conferences,321  and summary judgment.322  Indeed, these
procedures constitute the civil system's means of facilitating
settlement in part by requiring the exchange of information and
allowing for judicial input.3 2 3 This comparison to the civil system
suggests that proposals like Alschuler's or McConkie's are less
radical than they might otherwise seem.324
Judicial involvement both before and during plea bargaining
can help improve the quality of ex post fairness review. The earlier
involvement can help highlight particular instances where judges
should be concerned about the "bargained-for" sentences proposed
for judicial approval. For instance, if a judge hears a preliminary
adversarial presentation of the facts at the outset and indicates
the sentence she would likely impose, when the same judge (or a
different judge) sees a recommended sentence in a plea agreement
that deviates substantially from the judge's initial indication, that
scenario should prompt questions. It may be that the development
of a factual record rendered a higher or lower sentence much more
reasonable than it seemed at the outset. Or it may be that little
has changed except for the prosecutor bringing her leverage to
321 See Stephen McG. Bundy, The Policy in Favor of Settlement in an Adversary System,
44 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 3 (1992) (explaining that the 1983 amendments to Rule 16 "emphasize
the court's role in settlement negotiations").
322 See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 266 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(contending that the majority opinion invites judges to weigh evidence when deciding a
summary judgment motion); see also Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Second
Thoughts About Summary Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 73, 89 (1990) ("[S]ummary
judgment . .. has been transformed into a mechanism to assess plaintiffs likelihood of
prevailing at trial."); D. Theodore Rave, Note, Questioning the Efficiency of Summary
Judgment, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 875, 894-95 (2006) ("What is perhaps even more valuable is
that summary judgment gives the parties a neutral evaluation of the claim by an impartial
decisionmaker eviewing a substantial factual record.").
323 See Gold et al., supra note 9 (arguing that the procedural devices encourage settlement
by "improv[ing] access to information about the adversary's case to allow for more informed
bargaining" and "provid[ing] opportunities for the judge . . . to preview her view of the
merits").
324 Another possibility for early judicial involvement in criminal cases would be to track
civil procedure by providing a meaningful motion to dismiss based on the sufficiency of the
allegations-an approach my co-authors and I suggest elsewhere. See id. at 33-38. Such a
procedure would also improve courts' law-declaring function in criminal cases by allowing
for rulings at a time when no one has yet been adjudged guilty. See id. at 35-36 ("The
ability to challenge legal theories would also tend to clarify the law for future cases, which
would facilitate future plea bargaining. Criminal laws remain unclear because criminal
systems do not provide a good mechanism for courts to clarify the criminal law.").
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bear and securing a longer sentence than the judge thought would
fit. In that latter instance, the court should ask the prosecutor to
justify that decision even when the court cannot override it.325
All of the approaches suggested here involve additional judicial
process, which may seem inefficient. But there are two reasons to
think that may not be right. First, it is not obvious in the abstract
that the net result of these procedures would be increased cost.
More judicial involvement would add time costs and perhaps
monetary costs if additional judges became necessary. But if that
judicial involvement resulted in shorter sentences and thus lower
costs of incarceration, then the question of whether net costs
increased or decreased would be an empirical one. Second, the
benefit side of efficiency is too often ignored.326 Although it is very
difficult to monetize the added value of procedural fairness to
defendants, it is nonetheless an important benefit to set against
any potential increased costs.
Moreover, it is not so clear that assigning great weight to
efficiency in criminal law is sensible.327
Lastly, some readers might be skeptical of the practical hurdles
to broader judicial involvement in the plea process;328 that is fair,
but the time may be right to revisit these questions. Judge Rakoff
has drawn significant attention to the enormous pressures that
325 See supra Part II.A. 4.
326 See Coleman, supra note 320, at 1778-79 (arguing that in the civil context reformers
mistakenly equate efficient with cheap and fail to consider the benefits side of the efficiency
calculus).
327 See Darryl K. Brown, The Perverse Effects of Efficiency in Criminal Law, 100 VA. L.
REV. 183, 185-86 (2014) (arguing that efficiency in criminal law has perverse consequences
by enabling more prosecutions); see also Bibas, Designing Plea Bargaining, supra note 21,
at 1066 (arguing that the criminal justice system has adopted a mechanical process lacking
concern for individualized aspects of cases); Josh Bowers, Physician, Heal Thyself;
Discretion and the Problem of Excessive Prosecutorial Caseloads, a Response to Adam
Gershowitz and Laura Killinger, 106 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 143, 148 (2011) ("[A] lack of
resources may be the best available check against overzealous prosecution.").
328 See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 6, at 907-08 ("Perhaps the most common suggestion for
controlling prosecutorial abuses is to have greater federal court oversight over plea
bargaining [and] charging . . .. The problem with this type of reform is that it has not
shown itself to be viable."); Wright & Miller, supra note 121, at 1607 ("[J]udges have shown
little interest in regulating any aspect of prosecutorial decision-making.").
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plea bargaining creates for innocent defendants to plead guilty. 32 9
The Supreme Court's recognition in Frye that plea bargaining is
the criminal justice system said something widely known to
scholars and criminal lawyers but increased public salience of the
topic. 330 Similarly, as DNA technology has improved and come to
the fore, exonerations have received a great deal of attention, and
some of these wrongful convictions followed guilty pleas.331 And
indeed, federal judges have seemingly become more comfortable
policing deals between individuals and the government.332
V. CONCLUSION
In sum, this Article contends that much as with class counsel in
the class action context, judges can play an important role holding
329 See Rakoff, supra note 7; see also Daniel Beekman, Judge Jed Rakoff Says Plea-Deal
Process Is Broken, Offers Solution, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (May 27, 2014), http://www.nydailynews.
comlnews/crime/judge-plea-deal-process-fixed-article-1.180
6 358 (noting that "[tloo many
innocent people go to prison because the American plea bargain process is broken" and
recommending that judges become more involved so that "prosecutors armed with harsh
mandatory minimum sentences are less able to bully defendants').
33 See Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 133, 143-45 (2012).
331 See THE NAT'L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, EXONERATIONS IN 2014, at 1, 3 (2015),
http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/Exonerations i  2014_Report.pdf
(reporting that 125 wrongfully-convicted defendants were exonerated in 2014 and that more
than a third of those defendants pleaded guilty); Bruce A. Green & Ellen Yaroshefsky,
Prosecutorial Discretion and Post-Conviction Evidence of Innocence, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 467,
470-71 (2009) ("No one knows how many people who plead guilty or who are convicted by a
jury are factually innocent. But the number of exonerations in the comparatively few old
cases in which DNA testing can be conducted suggests that the numbers are meaningful.');
Daniel S. Medwed, Emotionally Charged: The Prosecutorial Charging Decision and the
Innocence Revolution, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2187, 2187 (2010) ("Since 1989, post-conviction
DNA testing has exonerated over two hundred and fifty inmates, and at least three hundred
other innocent prisoners have gained their freedom in cases lacking the magic bullet of
DNA."); see also John H. Blume & Rebecca K. Helm, The Unexonerated: Factually Innocent
Defendants Who Plead Guilty, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 157, 161-62 (2014) (analyzing why
innocent defendants plead guilty).
332 See, e.g., United States v. Orthofix, Inc., 956 F. Supp. 2d 316, 319, 321 (D. Mass. 2013)
(refusing to accept guilty pleas from two corporate defendants with binding sentencing
recommendations because those sentences did not adequately serve the public interest);
Ben Protess & Matthew Goldstein, Overruled, Judge Still Left a Mark on S.E.C. Agenda,
N.Y. TIMES (June 5, 2014), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/06/04/appeals-court-overturns-
decision-to-reject-s-e-c-citigroup-settlement/? r=O (arguing that other judges were inspired
by Judge Rakoffs rejection of an SEC settlement with Citigroup to question other
government securities settlements).
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prosecutors accountable. One of the core similarities between
class counsel's and the prosecutor's roles is the nature of their
clients-diffuse entities comprised of rationally apathetic
individuals. Accordingly, this Article contends that in neither
context can we expect the client to hold its lawyer accountable.
And courts can play a somewhat similar role in the criminal
context to protect the prosecutor's public-client to the one Rule 23
contemplates for judges to protect the class-client in class actions.
More specifically, this Article contends that judges should
review the substance of plea agreements to ensure that the
resulting sentence is fair to the prosecutor's public-client. Class
action law helps provide tools for judges in conducting that review.
First, judges should consider the bargaining process that resulted
in a particular plea agreement. Where courts see a lack of
information exchanged; threats to impose heavy sentences that
prosecutors can control such as mandatory minimums or
sentencing enhancements; or exploding plea deals, they should
look particularly carefully at whether the parties' recommended
sentence serves the public interest and consider whether to depart
from it. All offers or threats in the plea negotiation process should
be written to facilitate this review. Judges examining negotiating
procedure will not only help them determine the fairness of a deal;
so too will it likely alter lawyers' plea bargaining behavior to some
extent by encouraging prosecutors to disclose more evidence to
defendants and discouraging threatening behavior. Judges should
also elicit objections to sentences proposed in plea agreements,
much as class action judges hear from objectors; as in class
actions, the lawyers in criminal cases have no reason to present
evidence or argument that would break the deal once a deal is
done. Lastly, as two scholars have already recommended, judges
should (and seemingly already do) consider whether a proposed
sentence in a particular case diverges from the norm in that
jurisdiction.
Because mandatory minimums and sentencing enhancements
shift so much sentencing power to prosecutors, courts may find
themselves faced with a mandatory minimum that seems unduly
harsh. Separation of powers concerns prevent at least federal
courts from departing downward from the minimum that the
legislature has authorized and the prosecutor has decided to
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impose, but the judge is not powerless. Instead of altering the
sentence, the judge can express her concern and require the
prosecutor to justify the charging decision on the record in open
court, as judges have done in a few cases discussed above. That
approach will help facilitate internal accountability mechanisms
within prosecutors' offices and provide additional information for
challengers in prosecutor elections and for voters.
For an even greater judicial role, judges can hold settlement
hearings in open court in which they ask about the negotiation
process then underway and can gently suggest, much like a
mediator, that one side or the other should move from its position.
Asking judges to police themselves and not overstep at this point
to push a defendant into pleading guilty is a tall order, but open
court and a written record will help. Lastly, before plea
bargaining begins, a judge could hear the basics of the case and
indicate her preliminary view of what sentence she would likely
impose upon conviction. That step would inform the defendant's
choices and anchor plea bargaining with a potential sentence
generated by a neutral arbiter.
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